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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACTS OF IN-STATE PROCUREMENT PREFERENCE
POLICIES ON THE ECONOMY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Sawsan A. Abutabenjeh, 2014
Old Dominion University
Director: Professor Berhanu Mengistu

This research examined the impact of South Carolina's in-state preference
policies on the economy of the state. To achieve this purpose, the research sought to
answer the question: what are the impacts of implementing the in-state procurement
preference policies on the economy of the state of South Carolina? The question was
answered by using seven economic indicators: jobs, personal income, real disposable
income, output (sales), Gross State Product (GSP), value added and state's population.
The data related to the in-state preference policies were collected from the South
Carolina Procurement Services Office. The data was then analyzed using the Regional
Economic Model Policy Insight (REMI PI+) for economic-forecasting and policy-analysis.
The results revealed the existence of quantitative differences between the
baseline, which represents the values of the economic indicators without implementing
the preference policies, and the alternative forecast, which represents the values of the
economic indicators when implementing the policies. Specifically, the results showed
that implementing in-state preference policies presented economic benefits to the state
and its communities in the form of additional jobs, income, GSP, value added,
population and sales. From 2010 until 2017, the total economic impact of implementing
preference policies generated $17 million in total output, 135 total job- years, $10.22

million in GSP, $10.27 million in value added, $7.52 in income and $5.14 million in real
disposable personal income. The impact on the wholesale trade industry was over $5
million in total industry output and approximately 27 jobs. The manufacturing sector
had a total impact of over $4 million in total industry output and approximately 17 jobs.
The impact on the construction industry was approximately $3 million in total industry
output and approximately 30 jobs. Over 100 people w ere predicted to relocate to the
state within the next 8 years. Although the values of the economic indicators are very
small compared to the size of the state economy, they outweighed the direct cost of
preferences. The direct cost of preferences represents the extra dollars that
government pays when they award the contracts based on preferences. Overall,
implementing the in-state preference policies contributed to South Carolina's economy
However, further research is warranted to account for the total costs of implementing
the preference policies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

For much of the tw entieth century, public procurement has been used as a
policy tool to achieve various political, economic, and social objectives (M artin, 1996;
McCrudden, 2007; Pitzer & Thai, 2009; Rolfstam, 2008; Thai, 2001). Policy makers have
made federal, state, and local government procurement officials responsible for the
implementation of a variety of procurement policies not related to what they are
seeking to acquire in a particular procurement. Procurement officials in many states
have been required to grant preferences to in-state suppliers and/or goods and services
produced within the boundaries of the state's jurisdiction (McCrudden, 2007; Qiao,
Thai, & Cummings, 2009); these policies are hereafter referred to as in-state preference
policies, and they are the focus of this research.
The primary purpose of in-state preferences is to create economic opportunity
for in-state businesses by protecting them from out-of-jurisdiction competitors and to
encourage them to engage in productive economic activities for the benefit of their
state's economy and its residents as a whole (Hefner, 1996; Krasnokutskaya 8i Seim,
2008; McCrudden, 2007; Moreland, 2012; Qiao et al., 2009). In the literature, there is a
lack of studies to document the economic benefits of the in-state preference policies,
and this creates a significant gap, which this researcher aims to begin the process of
filling.
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The purpose of this study is to lay a foundation for the investigation of the
economic impacts of in-state preference policies on the economy of a single state,
namely, South Carolina. This chapter introduces the nature of the research by providing
background information, stating the problem, and explaining the purpose and the
significance of the research. Following this, the research question, the methodology,
and the assumptions are presented. The last part of this chapter describes the
limitations of the research.

Background

Government has always used its purchasing power to achieve particular
economic, social and political objectives (Qiao et al., 2009). The literature shows that
procurement policies are used to create employment opportunities, to provide fair
payment to vendors and employees, to promote conditions conducive to working, as
well as to protect the environment (Pitzer & Thai, 2009). Studies further reveal that
public procurement also has been used to provide preference to local vendors, small
businesses, and women and minority owned businesses. As a whole, the variety of
policies through which policy makers seek to grant an advantage to specified categories
of vendors - no m atter the basis for granting the preference in a particular instance falls under the umbrella of procurement preference policies.
The literature points to the existence of two broad categories of procurement
preference policies: those based on geographical preference laws and those based on
non-geographical preference laws (Qiao et al., 2009; Short, 1992). Geographical
2

preferences are based on the "geographical location" of a vendor or where a product or
a service is "produced" or construction is performed. Representative of these policies
based on geographical location are the Buy American Act at the federal level, in-state
preferences, and buy local preferences. In-state preferences, which are the focus of this
study, are granted to in-state vendors because of their geographical location or because
their goods and/or services are produced within the boundaries of the state's
jurisdiction. The second type of procurement preference programs is mandated by nongeographical preference laws which are based on the socioeconomic classification of
vendors. Using these non-geographical preference laws, governments award
procurement preferences to small, minority, women, disabled, veteran and
disadvantaged businesses. For example, the Small Business Act of 1953 was enacted to
help small, minorities, and other disadvantaged businesses by giving them opportunities
to expand their own businesses (Qiao et al., 2009). In addition "the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994...established a new 5% government-wide procurement
goal for wom en-owned business" (Qiao et al., 2009, p. 376).
The practice of using various preference policies is widespread in the U.S. The
National Association of State Procurement Officials (NASPO) released a 2011-2012
Survey of State Government Purchasing Practices that consisted of 28 sections
examining public procurement practices. In the section on state preference policies, the
survey showed that twenty-five states provide preferences to in-state bidders or
products that are not necessarily based on minority or women ownership or other
criteria, and that in seventeen of the twenty-five states, the preferences are mandatory
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(NASPO, 2012). The NASPO survey also reported that several states have adopted
preferences based on the socioeconomic classification of a vendor. Table 1.1 lists the
number of states that have vendor-based price preferences based on a variety of
socioeconomic classifications.

Table 1.1 States that Have Vendor-Based
(Non-Geographical-Based) Price Preferences

Vendor-Based Price Preferences

Number of States

W om en-owned business enterprise

4

Minority-owned business enterprise

6

Small business enterprise

11

Disabled-owned business enterprise

6

Sheltered workshop

18

Veteran-owned business enterprise

6

Service-disabled veteran owned business

6

Source: 2011-2012 NASPO Survey of State Procurement Practices

Rationales for adopting procurement preference policies are many and varied. At
the 2nd International Procurement Conference of the Americas held in 2005, some
scholars argued in favor of using preference policies to promote socioeconomic
objectives (Qiao et al., 2009). Some of the most common reasons cited in the literature
are a state's desire to increase competition in a specific industry and to engage and
support local, small, minority, and disadvantaged businesses in the market place
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(Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; Moreland, 2012; Qiao et al., 2009). A further rationale
argued by some scholars is that procurement preference policies would enhance social
equity by reserving some government contracts for minority and disadvantaged groups
(Frederickson, 1990). Another important goal pertaining to economic growth and
related mainly to in-state preference policies is that they encourage local businesses to
stay in their home state, thus creating more jobs, keeping the current jobs in the
economy, and increasing local tax returns by paying the tax dollars to the state (Hefner,
1996; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; McCrudden, 2007; Moreland, 2012; Qiao et al.,
2009).
Although supporters provide rationales that appear to have some merit, the
procurement preference policies have generated controversy in government and
business circles as well as in academia. Critics invariably argue th at preferential
treatm ent "violate[s] the basic principles of public purchasing, equity, impartiality, open
competition, and the least cost to the taxpayers" (Qiao et al., 2009, p. 379). In view of
these deficiencies, preferential treatm ent policies run contrary to the free market
principles and undermine competition in the market place. For example, The National
Institute of Governmental Purchasing (NIGP) and NASPO, tw o groups that vigorously
oppose procurement preference policies, argue that all types of preference laws and
practices are inconsistent with the free enterprise system and impede competition in
the market place (M oreland, 2012; Qiao et al., 2009; Short, 1992; Strayer, 2011). At the
state level, critics further contend that preference policies that constrain/discourage
competition and protect state vendors are likely to lead to higher taxes, higher product
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prices, and reduced efficiencies (Hefner, 1996). Critics also say that protecting in-state
vendors from competition will limit their motivation to enhance labor productivity and
develop cost saving strategies (Hefner, 1996). In addition to the previous criticisms of
implementing preferences, there are legal challenges for implementing in-state
preference policies. The basis for these challenges includes asserted violations of the
U.S. Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities, Commerce, and Equal Protection clauses.
Two cases that related to these challenges are citied in Chapter II of this dissertation.
In summary, the existence of opposing views raises concerns regarding the
appropriateness of procurement preference policies that some states pursue vigorously
(Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008). In light of the unresolved disputes or controversies
between supporters and opponents about the benefits of procurement preference
policies, it is im portant and proper to examine w hat the economic benefits from
procurement preference policies are.

Problem Statement

W hen considering in-state preferences, policy makers must resolve what often
appears to be a fundamental tension between those in favor of and those opposed to
preferences. Taking advantage of the opportunities that in-state preference policies
offer requires meeting the challenges presented by those opposed to the policies, and
this dilemma has generated considerable debate among politicians, businesses, and
academics. The debates surrounding in-state preference policies revolve in large part
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around a couple of issues such as w hether in-state preference policies promote or
hinder competition in the market place and provide economic gains or losses for the
state. As noted previously, opponents of in-state preference policies invoke the
principles of the free market economic system arguing that government interference
distorts the functioning of the free market and undermines competition leading to
inefficiencies, low productivity, and related economic malaise (Qiao et al., 2009).
Because of these questions and concerns, procurement preference programs have been
" a very im portant and controversial issue and ... research on many of its facets is
limited" (Qiao et al., 2009, pp. 396-397). The controversies will continue unabated until
more research provides evidence-based answers to help understand the economic
impact of in-state preference policies.

The Purpose of this Research

The purpose of this research is to investigate the economic impacts of South
Carolina's in-state procurement preference policies on the state economy. As indicated
in the preceding section, both supporters and opponents of procurement preference
policies make contradictory claims. Yet, there is a lack of studies to support their
respective claims. This lack of investigation to determine the economic benefits of in
state preference policies creates an important gap in the literature. This research
attempts to begin to fill the current gap in the literature by examining the economic
impacts from adopting procurement preference policies. It is im portant to emphasize
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that the intent of this scholarly research is not to explain the reasons behind preference
policies since "their existence is more likely to be due to the political power of certain
interest groups" (McAfee & McMillan, 1989, p. 292). Instead, this research primarily
contributes to the area of preference policies because "a longitudinal review of [the
policies'] results is never conducted" (Qiao et al., 2009, p. 397).

The Research Question

Research has shown that some states in the U.S. adopt procurement preference
policies to promote important social and economic goals that include helping state
businesses, protecting state vendors, creating more jobs, and increasing tax revenues
for the state (Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; Qiao et al., 2009). The purpose of this
research is to examine the benefits the state of South Carolina could achieve by
implementing the in-state preference policies for an eight-year period (2010-2017). To
achieve this purpose, the research must answer the question: w hat are the impacts o f
implementing the in-state procurement preference policies on the economy o f the state
o f South Carolina? Using the case of South Carolina's preference policies, this research
utilizes the Regional Economic Model Policy Insight (REMI PI+) for economic-forecasting
and policy-analysis to estimate the economic impact of the South Carolina preference
policies on the state economy.

Methodology

This research employs the Policy Insight Model (REMI PI+) developed by Regional
Economic Model (REMI), Inc. Specifically, the Policy Insight, version 1. 5.2, also known
by its abbreviation, PI+, is the version utilized in this research. The researcher uses the
name REMI PI+ or simply PI+ interchangeably throughout this study. Researchers,
practitioners and professionals from several private, public and nonprofit organizations
have used the REMI model for structural forecasting and policy analysis for over thirty
years. The REMI PI+ model is a useful analytical tool to examine in-state preference
policies. Further details about the model's usage will be discussed in Chapter III of this
dissertation. The researcher will use this model in this study to answer the research
question and achieve the purpose of this research, which is to examine South Carolina's
preference policies and their impacts on the economy of the state. Essentially, PI+
answers the question "What if...?" any change in a policy would affect the regional and
local economies and adjust to those changes which will occur on a year-by-year basis
(REMI, 2007). Below is a brief description of the selected model.
The overall structure of the REMI PI+ is divided into five major blocks. The blocks
are output and demand, labor and capital demand, population and labor force,
compensation, prices and costs, and m arket shares (see Chart 1.1 on page 16). Each
block consists of economic variables. There is a high level of interaction and connection
among these variables. For example, a small change in one variable will indeed affect

other variables in the same block and other blocks as well. The component parts of each
block are:
•

The output and demand block- consists of output, demand, consumption,
investment, government spending, exports, and imports.

•

The labor and capital demand block- includes labor intensity, labor productivity,
and demand for labor and capital.

•

The population and labor supply block- consists of labor force participation rate
and migration equations.

•

The compensation, prices, and costs block- consists of composite prices,
determinants of production costs, the consumption price deflator, housing
prices, and the compensation equations.

•

The m arket shares block- consists of the proportion of local, inter-regional, and
export markets captured by each region.

By utilizing PI+, the researcher attempts to find out if implementing in-state
preference policies can benefit the state's economy by creating more jobs, increasing
personal income, real disposable personal income, value added, the state's population,
Gross State Product (GSP), and output in the case of the state of South Carolina from
2010 until 2017. South Carolina's procurement contract data are used as an input to the
selected model. The data consists of a policy variable that is measured by the dollar
amount of the industry sales. The dollar values of the state of South Carolina's
procurement spending that was impacted by the in-state preference policies during the
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period 2010-2012 and the values o f other economic variables explained in the five
blocks in the previous paragraphs will be embedded in the PI+. The researcher obtained
the data from the Office of Audit and Certification, a subdivision of the Procurement
Services Office in South Carolina Budget and Control Board. For the years 2013- 2017,
the average spending will be calculated and used to forecast the economic impact.
REMI's staff developed the model and collected the data for the other variables
included in the PI+ from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
the Departm ent of Energy, and the Census Bureau.

Significance of this Research

Studies have shown the importance of government intervention in the economy
on certain occasions to improve the welfare of a segment of society (Krueger, 1991;
Reinert, 1999; World Trade Organization, 2012). Even though public procurement is a
frequently used method to intervene in the economy, little has been written on this
topic (MacManus, Watson, & Blair, 1992; McCue & Gianakis, 2001; Snider & Rendon,
2008; Thai, 2001). Snider and Rendon (2008) have emphasized that scholars need to
give sufficient attention and efforts in terms of conceptualizing and developing
theoretical frameworks that can allow researchers and students alike to understand the
complexities involved in making procurement policies. Similarly for in-state preference
policies, scholars and researchers have emphasized the importance of conducting more
research because "the practical impact of preferences is worthy of much more analysis"
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(Qiao et al., 2009, p. 397). Therefore, the contribution of this research is to establish the
linkage between the conceptual (theoretical) knowledge and the practical application in
the area of preference policies.
This research also will contribute to the body of knowledge of public
procurement by enhancing the knowledge base of policymakers, voters and taxpayers.
As Qiao et al. (2009, p. 398) asserted "procurement has always been and will continue
to be used as an important policy tool for a wide range of socioeconomic and political
purposes". In view of this assertion, research can help voters and taxpayers become
more informed and gain the knowledge to understand the benefits of implementing
preference policies. Furthermore, the results will provide an information base for
policymakers, which could influence their perspectives and decisions pertinent to
preferential policies. If the results show that procurement preference policies contribute
to the economic goals, policy makers and public administrators should continue
implementing these policies. In contrast, if the research findings show that South
Carolina's preference policies are not achieving the desired goals, then the state
policymakers may need to rethink implementing procurement preference policies. In
either case, policymakers and public officials should give more attention to the costs
associated with implementing the preference policies
This research provides database information about the state of South Carolina's
preference policies specifically and preference policies in general. The data from the
quarterly procurement preference reports will help to determ ine the type of goods and
services and the industry used when implementing in-state preference policies.
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Furthermore, this data set will help decision makers learn more about the rules
and procedures associated with applying for in-state preference policies. This research
will move the field forward because it will establish a foundation for future investigation
into the study of the economic impact on each of the 24 states applying in-state
preferences. Other research areas could include a comparative study to increase
understanding of the differences and the similarities among the in-state preference
policies in the states. Comparing the economic impact between the 25 states will add a
new perspective to the analysis and stands as a topic for future research. Finally, this
study also highlighted the need to investigate reciprocal preferences.

Assumptions

Assumptions are essential for research, and four assumptions provide the basis
for this study. First, the dollar values of the procurement contracts awarded based on
preference policy were considered the sales variable. This study assumed that increases
in sales in the economy sectors are due to implementing the in-state preference
policies. Second, South Carolina state agencies reported to the South Carolina Budget
and Control Board the procurement contracts awarded based on the in-state preference
policies, and this study assumed that all the reported data are complete and correct.
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Third, after the South Carolina Budget and Control Board received the data about the
procurement contracts, the Board compiled the data into Quarterly Preference reports.
The assumption is that the reports contained accurate and correct data. Fourth, the
researcher assumed that the North American Industry Classification System's (NAICS)
identification for the procurement contracts is correct.

Limitations of this Research

Although twenty-five states have adopted in-state procurement preference laws
in one form or another, this investigation is limited to the state of South Carolina. The
researcher chose South Carolina because that state's central procurement office agreed
to provide access to relevant procurement preference data. In addition, REMI Inc. has
provided access to PI+ for the state of South Carolina for the purpose of this research;
however, due to lack of funding, the researcher was not able to purchase additional
versions of the model. The findings of this research, which focuses only on one state,
cannot be generalized to other states, and this constitutes a limitation of this research.
Another limitation is that the accuracy of the data collected from the Office of Audit and
Certification, a subdivision of the Procurement Services Office in the South Carolina
Budget and Control Board, and the values of all the variables embedded in the REMI PI+
model cannot be verified. In addition, the economic costs (except the direct preference
cost) and the social benefits of the preference policies are not analyzed in this study,

and this constitutes a limitation of this research. The final limitation is that this analysis
will not factor in the effect of reciprocal policies on South Carolina vendors when they
bid on contracts in states that apply reciprocal policies. The effect of reciprocal policies
on South Carolina vendors could be significant, meaning that the findings of this initial
research could be misleading.

Organization of this Research

This research consists of five chapters. Chapter I introduced the background of
this research and presented the problem, the purpose of the research and the research
question in addition to the methodology, the assumptions, the significance and the
limitations of the research. Chapter II provides a literature review that draws on
theoretical perspectives related to international trade, national welfare, and social
equity arguments. The previous studies and research presented in Chapter II help to
understand the context of this research. Chapter III covers the methodology used in this
research and includes an overview of the utilized PI+ and a description of all the model's
variables and the data provided. Chapter IV discusses the analysis of the data and
presents the results of the model. Chapter V summarizes the research and the results,
the research implications, future research and limitations of the research.
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Chart 1.1: REMI M odel's Blocks
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Public procurement has an important role in delivering goods and services to
citizens. Even though one of the government's main responsibilities is to buy goods and
services, a related responsibility is to achieve a variety of social, economic and
environmental objectives through adopting a variety of policies such as state preference
policies. State governments use in-state preference policies to grant an advantage to in
state vendors when awarding procurement contracts. The implied main purpose of in
state preferences is to create economic opportunity and to encourage in-state
businesses to engage in productive economic activities for the benefit of the state's
residents as a whole (Hefner, 1996; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; Qiao et al., 2009).
To study the impact of in-state preference policies on the state's economy, this
research utilizes the international trade literature focusing on protectionist arguments.
The international trade literature provides an overarching explanation to help
understand w hat the state could predict as the result of applying the in-state
preferences. Within the international trade context, governments use a variety of
strategies such as tariffs, import quotas, subsidies and formal policies to intervene in
trade. Formal policies represent a government's action to discriminate against foreign
competitors and firms, and they are "often considered to be a non-tariff barrier to
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trade" (Trionfetti, 1999, p. 235). Since these formal policies "can be considered a part of
a whole gamut of economic policies (such as tariffs, subsidies, exchange restrictions, and
quotas)" (Lowinger, 1976, p. 451), studies have argued that the formal policies (non
tariff barriers) would have a "protective effect" similar to the other tariff barriers
(Lowinger, 1976; McAfee & McMillan, 1989).
In many respects, the rationales used by governments to intervene in
international trade are strikingly similar to the rationales a state government employs
for the adoption of in-state procurement preference policies. Like the international
preference policies, state preference policies are formal policies that policy makers seek
to use as non-tariff barriers within the state context. Therefore, this study argues that
the theoretical arguments for or against a variety of discriminatory policies and
strategies in international trade could help understand what the impact of in-state
procurement preference policies would be in the context of the domestic economy.
This chapter will start with an overview of international trade theories and
explain a variety of intervention strategies as instruments to trade. After the overview,
there will be a discussion of general procurement preference policies followed by a
specific focus on the preference policies implemented by the state of South Carolina.
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International Trade Theory

Governments around the world spend a significant am ount of money to buy
goods, services, and construction. Through their purchasing power, governments affect
and stimulate the economic growth of their countries. A study by Trionfetti "estimatefs]
[that] the size of the government procurement m a rk e t... ranges between 8 and 12 per
cent of GSP for industrialized countries" (Trionfetti, 2000, p. 73). Governments have the
choice to purchase the needed products and services from local sources or from foreign
countries. International trade policies are guided by international trade policies, and
governments use these policies as a way to intervene in the economy.
Interventionism is an old idea that extends back to ancient times. As far back as
the mid-sixteenth century, mercantilists sought to build national wealth through the
accumulation of gold and silver by exporting more and importing less (Hill, 2011), which
was in essence a restriction of free trade and a form of protectionism. But, subsequent
theoretical developments, from Adam Smith's absolute advantage to Ricardo's
comparative advantage, to Heckscher-Ohlin theory, to the development of new trade
theory in recent times, have offered arguments for the continued use and promotion of
trade between and among nations because of a strong belief th a t there are gains to be
made from trade. Charles Hill, for example, provides the following historical anecdote
regarding the start of free trade:

The theoretical case for free trade dates to the late eighteenth century and the
work of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Free trade as a government policy was
first officially embraced by Great Britain in 1846, when the British Parliament
repealed the Corn Laws that placed a high tariff on imports of foreign corn. The
objectives of the Corn Laws were to raise government revenues and to protect
British corn producers (Hill, 2011, p. 222).
Even though the development of trade theories helps explain the international
trade patterns in the world, "they lack agreement in their recommendations for
government policy" (Hill, 2011, p. 163). As such, governments use a variety of strategies
to intervene in trade such as tariffs, import quotas, and subsidies. A tariff is a type of tax
imposed on imports or exports. Tariffs are levied in tw o forms, either as a fixed
percentage on each imported good or as a part of the value of the imported good.
Import quotas impose restrictions on the imported quantity to the country, while
government provides subsidies in the form of cash, low-interest loans, and tax breaks.
Although these strategies differ in many respects, they still all constitute
governmental intervention in trade. In addition to these strategies, governments
employ formal and informal policies as barriers to trade. Formal policies require
governments to give preference to specific products, services, or industries. For
example, the U.S. government implements the Buy American Act, which gives
preference to American products in awards of contracts by the U.S. government and
recipients of grants-in-aid from the U.S. federal government. O ther countries use
informal policies to put up rules/barriers to restrict trade among other countries.
France's demand that all videotape recorders imported from Japan enter the country
from a point located far from the nearest shipping port is a clear example of an informal
policy to restrict trade.
20

As with all instruments and policies of trade, the question becomes why nations
engage in discriminatory or preferential trade practices. Governments provide a variety
of arguments to justify their interventions such as social, political, and economic
reasons. Governmental decisions to grant preferential trade treatm ent are motivated by
a desire to build strong relations between the countries to achieve some specified social
or human rights objective. For example, prior to China joining the WTO in 2001, the
United States granted Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to China to try to improve the
human rights policies in that country (Green, 1993; Pregelj, 2001; Ward, 2000). MFN
status allowed China to export goods to the United States at an average of 8 percent
tariffs; without MFN, the tariffs would have been about 40 percent (Hill, 2011).
Of the various objectives countries hope to gain from applying preferential trade
policies, the literature shows that protectionism overshadows the other motivations for
governments' intervention (Hill, 2011). Governments protect consumers from
dangerous products, protect the defense industry for reasons of national security, and
protect jobs and industries from foreign competition.
On economic grounds, the oldest reason for protectionism was the infant
industry argument (Hill, 2011; Hoekman, 1998). The infant industry argument was by far
the most popular argument among developing nations (Shafaeddin, 2000) and had
considerable influence in developed countries as well. The rationale was clear in that
developing countries needed time to build their manufacturing sector so that the sector
could compete with established industries in developed countries. Shafaeddin (2000, p.
2) argued "that infant industry protection is necessary for countries at the early stages
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of industrialization if some countries outdistanced others in manufactures".
Aside from the infant industry argument that was primarily applicable to
developing countries, many developed nations have implemented different policies to
erect protectionism against imports that threaten the survival of their domestic
industries. Examples of protectionist policies adopted by many nations around the world
including the United States and the European Union (EU) abound in the literature. One
such example is the EU's establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The
intent of the CAP policy was to protect the jobs of Europe's politically powerful farmers
by restricting imports and guaranteeing prices, but studies showed that the
consequence was higher prices for consumers.
In the case of the United States, there are many instances where the
government resorted to protectionism on economic and/or political grounds. Historical
accounts reveal that during the height of the Great Depression, the U.S. Congress
passed the Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930 to deal with the rising level of unemployment by
protecting domestic industries and restricting imports. The tariff was increased by about
60 percent on more than 3000 products and 900 American import duties were created
(Boffa & Olarreaga, 2012; Hill, 2011; The Economist, 2009).
The Smoot-Hawley Act is a case in point that provides an example that even
economically advanced nations such as the United States, that are expected to gain the
most from free trade, do sometimes resort to protectionism because of economic
imperatives at a given historical juncture. According to some studies, while the SmootHawley Act appeared to protect the local industries at the time, the Act nonetheless
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caused a retaliatory response from nearly 60 countries, and world trade plummeted;
this retaliatory response was believed to be the primary contributor to a seventy
percent reduction in world trade by 1933 (Boffa & Olarreaga, 2012). Latter time
economists and other writers alike characterized the Smoot-Hawley Act as a failure
because it had a damaging effect on employment abroad, which in turn, forced other
countries to react to the U.S. action by raising their own tariff barriers, commonly
referred to in the literature as "a beggar thy neighbor policy". As a result, U.S. exports
tumbled in response, and the world slid further into the Great Depression. Hill (2011, p.
223) emphasized the fact that the Act "erected an enormous wall of tariff barriers.
Almost every industry was rewarded with its 'm ade-to- order' tariff".
Literature shows that there were instances where the United States also
intervened in international trade to protect U.S. farmers. For example, in 2000,
President George W. Bush signed $180 billion subsidies for U.S. farmers, and a bill
containing $286 billion in subsidies for 10 years was signed in 2007 (Hill, 2011). In
addition, in 2002, the U.S. placed tariffs on imports of foreign steel to give competitive
advantage to American steel industries so that American jobs could be protected (Hill,

2011 ).
While strong economic arguments can be made in support of subsidies and
tariffs, the actions nonetheless represent protectionism and contradict the principles of
free international trade (Ferrini, 2012; Hickok, 1985; Hill, 2011; Hufbauer, Berliner, &
Elliott, 1986; Tarr & Morkre, 1984; Wood & Mudd, 1978). To fight protectionism and
advocate for unrestricted free trade, a variety of international agreements such as the
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA), and a series of Directives from the European Union (EU) have
continued to play an important role in ensuring the free flow of goods and services
across national borders.
Many nations embrace the principles of free trade and accept the rules of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor of GATT. In 1947, the U.S. led the
establishment of GATT and by 2 00 3 ,1 5 9 nations had signed the multilateral agreement
which regulates trade among countries and mainly aims to reduce any type of
protectionist instruments or policies. As an effort to extend the basic principles of GATT,
the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) was signed in 1979 and entered into
force in 1981 as a "plurilateral" agreement. Today, 15 countries have signed the GPA
and three countries are considering the adoption of the rules (OUSTR, 2012).
The GPA is perhaps one of the most important international agreements
pertaining to government procurement regulation today. GPA generally prohibits
discriminatory policies favoring domestic firms and encourages competitive tendering
procedures. However, GPA also has provisions that allow countries to engage in
negotiations as the quotation below demonstrates.
Although in principle the GPA prohibits signatories from discriminating in favor
of domestic firms, developing countries negotiate mutually acceptable
exclusions from the rules on national treatm ent for certain entities, products, or
services. Such negotiations may also be initiated after signing the procurement
agreement. That option, however, is limited to certain entities, products or
services, and the scope to pursue such policies is therefore inherently limited by
the relative negotiating power of the country seeking to apply them (Hoekman,
1998, pp. 252-253).
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In addition to GATT and GPA, the European Union (EU) also has made important
contributions in terms of adopting a series of procurement directives that affected the
development of the previous GPA principles (Gordon, Rimmer, & Arrowsmith, 199 8 ).
The EU and the GPA have common objectives regarding their approach to procurement
regulations and markets. For example, the EU has a "public procurement legislation
[that] sets out procedures and practices to which central and local government and
other public bodies must adapt their award procedures, where the value of the contract
as estimated under the rules meets the relevant threshold" (Achille, 2011, p. 2). In
general, all the EU directives imply that public procurement markets should be open
among all competitors w ithout discrimination. "The basic principles [are], notably non
discrimination, equal treatm ent and transparency in the publicity of proposed
procurement contracts, design of technical specifications; choice of procurement
procedure; qualification and selection of candidates and tenderers [and] award of
contracts" (OECD, 2011, p. 3).
The impact and effectiveness of the EU procurement rules have been examined
in the literature (Cox & Furlong, 1995; Erridge, Fee, & Mcllroy, 1998; Gelderman,
Ghijsen, & Brugman, 2006; Madsen, 2002; Nielsen & Hansen, 2001). Gordon et al.
(1998) analyzed a study by the European Commission that investigated the impact of
the European procurement rules on the effectiveness of the EU's procurement policy
from 1987 to 1994. The results of the analysis showed that apart from a very few
sectors the EU's desired objectives against protectionism were largely not achieved due
primarily to "the problem of effective enforcement, lack of clarity in the rules, the
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existence of structural market obstacles, and lack of response on the supply side"
(Gordon et al., 1998, p. 1 8 5 ).
However, other studies have reported positive results about the direct impact of
the EU's procurement policies. For example, the European Commission (2004) prepared
a study to evaluate the impact of EU's rules and directives for the period 1995-2002 on
the transparency of procurement procedures, the prices of goods and services, and the
cross-border activity in public procurement markets. The analysis indicated the
existence of "positive developments in market transparency, increased cross border
competition and price savings derived from the implementation of public procurement
directives (European Commission, 2004, p. 1). The report also pointed to overwhelming
evidence supporting the active contributions of current directives to reform the public
procurement markets (European Commission, 2004).
The decisions made and the actions taken to erect barriers to free trade are not
without consequences; there are indeed impacts and effects associated with the policies
of protectionism that seek to protect domestic industries by creating trade barriers.
Researchers began to study the economic impact of discriminatory procurement
practices on international trade flow in the 1970s (Audet, 2002; Baldwin, 1982; Baldwin
&. Richardson, 1972; Lowinger, 1976). The work by Baldwin and Richardson (1972) is
considered to be the starting point for research into discriminatory procurement
practices within the international trade context.
Basing their investigation on the assumptions that the market is perfectly
competitive, and that the imported commodities are identical to the commodities
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produced domestically, Baldwin and Richardson (1972) and Baldwin (1 9 70 ,19 8 2) set up
a model to analyze the impact of the discriminatory policies on imports, output, and
domestic prices, and then used the model to estimate the impact of the Buy American
Act of 1933 on imports. Their model is based on demand and supply curves and inputoutput tables. According to their analysis, they found that the effect of giving preference
to domestic producers is varied. After imposing the preference, government demand
shifted from foreign products to local products, and as a result th e prices of domestic
products rose above the foreign prices and shifted private demand from domestic to
foreign procurers. In this case, if government demand is less than the domestic supply,
there is no effect from the preferences. If government demand is larger than domestic
supply, the domestic prices increase, the output of domestic producers increases and
the price of imports decreases.
On the basis of the previous discussion, Baldwin and Richardson (1972) and
Baldwin (1 9 7 0 ,1 9 8 2 ) concluded that the Buy American Act reduced total U.S. imports
between $76 million to $110 million, which is considered to be a small impact compared
to U.S. total imports. They concluded that when government demand for domestic
product shifts, the private sector's imports shift as well in an equal and opposite
direction. Reaching a similar conclusion Deltas and Evenett (1997) found that the extra
procurement costs offset the extra welfare gains from implementing the discriminatory
procurement policies.

Following Baldwin and Richardson's assumption that the market is perfectly
competitive, Herander (1982) investigated the impact of discriminatory policies on
domestic output, consumption, the price of the good in the importing country, and the
level of imports. He investigated the impact between tw o countries using a partial
equilibrium model. When Herander analyzed three scenarios depending on whether
government demand is larger, smaller, or equal to the domestic supply, he found that
when the government demand is larger than or equal to the domestic supply, imports
decrease, and domestic output and prices increase. However, when government
demand is less than the domestic supply, the discriminatory policy is ineffective.
In addition to the previous studies, Lowinger (1976) used input-output tables to
compare government imports and private sector imports during the 1970s for the U.S.,
U.K. and EU member countries. He based his analysis on the assumption that the
quantitative difference between the countries' imports equals the impact of
discriminatory policies. He concluded that the U.S.'s degree of discrimination is the
highest and has the largest effect on imports. So, when the U.S. reduces its
discriminatory policies, its imports are expected to increase six or seven times the actual
level of imports.
Expanding Lowinger's work, Deardorff and Stern (1981) studied the impact of
the reduced tariffs discussed at the Tokyo Roundtable on exports, employment,
economic welfare, exchange rates and imports. By using demand and supply models for
several developed and developing countries, they concluded that reducing tariffs would
result in "relatively small but beneficial economic effects for practically all the major
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industrialized countries and for some of the major developing countries" (Deardorff &
Stern, 1981, p. 148).
In conclusion, beginning in the 1970s, economists conducted research to study
one or more aspects of the impact of discriminatory policies on international trade and
trade flow. However, overtime, scholars have failed to address some aspects of the
policy, and have identified caveats in the previous work and attem pted to address them
by adding more dimensions to their research. Audet (2002, pp. 157-158) summarized
the progression of the research from the 1970s to current times:

This brief survey of academic research on the impact of government
procurement on international specialization and trade highlights the inherently
complex task of conceptualizing multiple and intertwined factors into a
theoretical modeling exercise, particularly in conceptualizing implicit forms of
discriminatory practices. Greater understanding of several related aspects, such
as transparency and non-discriminatory provisions, bidders' behavior,
informational asymmetries, distribution effects and the dynamic effects of
procurement preferences, could usefully provide additional policy underpinning
and insights.

Generally, the results of research show that the impacts of favoring local vendors
in the international trade theory context depend on the setting, the assumptions made,
and the methods used in the analysis, and therefore, the impacts of preference policies
on the economy are mixed. However, this research argues that the trade framework still
does provide a theoretical base for studying in-state preferences. The following section
gives an overview of procurement preference policies.
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Procurem ent Preference Policies

As the previous discussion indicated, national governments intervene in trade
mainly to protect their own country's vendors and suppliers. Similarly, state
governments use procurement preference policies to protect in-state businesses from
being undermined or undercut by large conglomerates that may come from within the
state or from neighboring states (McCrudden, 2007; Qiao et al., 2009). So, the rationale
for adopting procurement preference policies in the domestic context is similar to the
rationale presented in support of government intervention in international trade.
Governments apply preference policies to protect vendors and achieve a variety
of social, economic and political goals. Preference policies may stimulate the economy
and as a result improve the welfare of disadvantaged members o f society as well as
advance the collective interests of the citizens of the country. Another rationale for the
adoption of preference policies is a state's desire to increase competition in a specific
industry (Hefner, 1996; Krugman & Obstfeld, 1991). On the state and local levels,
preference policies help to engage and protect local businesses in the market place thus
serving as incentives for local businesses to stay, grow, and thrive in the state, as well as
to create more jobs and expand the state's tax base.
Some scholars support the view that procurement preference policies are an
appropriate tool to promote economic goals, and it is common to see policymakers at all
levels of government use preference policies even though critics point to the potential
problems associated with them. However, opponents of preferential treatm ents argue
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against the use of preference policies claiming that preferential treatm ent runs contrary
to the free market principles, increases cost to government, and undermines
competition in the market place (Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; McCrudden, 2007; Qiao
et al., 2009; Short, 1992). For example, NIGP vigorously opposes preference policies
arguing that all types of preference laws and practices are inconsistent with the free
enterprise system and impede competition in the market place (Achille, 2011). In a
similar vein, NASPO opposes procurement preference policies arguing that businesses
and special interest groups are likely to exercise undue influence in the promotion of
preference laws. NASPO stated, "preference provisions and practices should be
eliminated from public purchasing. Government bodies and legislatures must recognize
that preference is promoted by business and special interest groups, that the net effect
is costly, and that efforts to establish or maintain preference need to be resisted" (as
citied in Qiao et al., 2009, p. 379). Critics further contend that preference policies
constrain/discourage competition and protect local vendors and are likely to lead to
higher taxes, higher product prices, and reduced efficiencies (Strayer, 2011). They also
feel that protecting local vendors from competition will limit their motivation to
enhance labor productivity and to develop cost saving strategies (Hefner, 1996).
Furthermore, opponents point out that the preference laws have been
challenged on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause in different states (Hefner, 1996;
Qiao et al., 2009). For example, Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. challenged the in-state
preference laws in South Carolina when they submitted a bid to supply concrete culvert
pipe in South Carolina. Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. provided the lowest bid on 15 out of 47
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sub-bids for the pipe contract, but they were not qualified to claim the in-state
preferences. So as a result, the corporation was awarded only tw o contracts and
consequently sued South Carolina for violating the Equal Protection Clause. After going
through the courts, "it was conceded that the preference scheme would withstand an
equal protection challenge, so long as the challenge drawn is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest" (Hefner, 1996, p. 34). Similarly, in an award involving a racial
preference rather than a preference based on the location of a bidder, the city of
Richmond was challenged under the Equal Protection Clause when it awarded a city
construction procurement project based on the city's minority business preference
policies (Chambers, 1991; Gregg & Karen, 1990; Qiao et al., 2009). In this case, the court
concluded that "the [city] plan was not narrowly focused since it permitted minorities
from outside the Richmond area to participate in an absolute preference over other
citizens purely on race" (as citied in Qiao et al., 2009, p. 380).
The variety of procurement preferences are categorized under two types:
geographical and non-geographical preference laws (Qiao et al., 2009; Short, 1992). The
geographical preferences are based on the "geographical location" of a vendor or where
a product or service is "made". There are three types of geographical preferences based
on the level of the government implementing the preference; the three preferences are
the Buy American Act at the federal level, in-state preferences at the state level, and
buy local preferences at the local level.

In 1933, Congress passed the Buy American Act which was enacted to protect
the American economy by requiring the U.S. government to purchase U.S.-made
products and provide employment opportunities for American workers (Pitzer & Thai,
2009; Qiao et al., 2009). At the state level, the in-state preferences are granted to in
state vendors because of their geographical location, and/or because their goods and/or
services are produced within the boundaries of the state's jurisdiction. Buy local
preferences also require local procurement officials to follow a formal and/or informal
competitive bidding process to give advantage to local vendors over non-local vendors
when local governments are in need of products and/or services.
There are five types of laws to grant the geographical preferences. First, the tie
bid preference gives preference to in-jurisdiction bidders only if their bids are identically
priced with the other non-local bidders. Second, a percentage preference applies a fixed
percentage of the bid price to the out-of-jurisdiction firm's bid price; the in-jurisdiction
bidder is then considered the low bid if the adjusted bid is less than the actual bid price
of the out-of-jurisdiction bidder. Third, the absolute preference policy requires the
purchasing office of the jurisdiction " to buy certain goods or services from vendors
[located] within a designated area" (Qiao et al., 2009, p. 374). Fourth, general
preference law gives a wide range of preference to serve the interest of the state (Qiao
et al., 2009; Short, 1992); however "due to its administrative ambiguousness, it is
difficult to document or assess this type of preference law" (Qiao et al., 2009, p. 373).
Lastly, the reciprocal preference laws add a percentage to the out-of-state vendors
when their own states impose preferences on the out-of-state vendors, so they work in
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the opposite direction of in-state preference policies. Thirty-five states apply reciprocal
preference laws to achieve equal treatm ent for their interested vendors against the
bidders who get preference treatm ent in their own states.
In addition to the previous preferences based on geographical criteria, the
second type of preference programs comprises those in which governments have
adopted non-geographical preferences. These preferences are based on the
socioeconomic classification of vendors and are awarded to small, minority, women,
disabled, veteran and disadvantaged businesses. Scholars have argued that reserving
some government contracts for a specific part of the society would indeed enhance
social equity (Frederickson, 1990; Hefner, 1996; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; Qiao et
al., 2009). Thus, preference policies could be used in the economic sphere to reduce
severe income inequality.
Historical accounts reveal that underserved businesses "have historically been
uninvolved in the contracting and procurement activities of government agencies and
authorities" (Rice, 1991, p. 114). To correct this past discrimination, governments at the
federal and state level have passed laws requiring government agencies to reserve or
set aside some procurement contracts for a certain segment o f businesses to encourage
them to participate in the local economy (Enchautegui, Fix, Loprest, Lippe, & Wissoker,
1997) and to overcome the "continuing effects of past discrimination" (Svara & Brunet,
2004, p. 100). According to Enchautegui et al. (1997), at least at the federal level, there
were many acts that required the federal government to give advantages to minorities
and small businesses such as the 1997 Small Business Reauthorization Act. The authors
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thus remarked: "No doubt the set-aside provision has enhanced social equity"
(Enchautegui et al., 1997, p. 15). To defend the set-aside programs, disparity studies
that focused on the effect of past discrimination in federal government contracts
against minority-owned businesses have been conducted and documented (Bates,
2001). For example, according to Rice (1991), the city of Atlanta conducted a disparity
study to provide evidence of discrimination against minority entrepreneurs, and the
results showed that discrimination had occurred in many areas o f economic activities
including construction, real estate, architectural, and energy industries. Statistical data
also documented discriminatory practices in the financial sector between black-owned
and white-owned businesses (Rice, 1991).
Nevertheless, some studies reveal that set-aside programs have been criticized
for violating the fundamental principles of equity. Critics point out that the granting of
public contracts based on a set of rules or criteria that favor certain socioeconomic
classes or groups of individuals is fundamentally flawed and runs contrary to the equity
principles that involve fairness, efficiency, justice and equal treatm ent in public service
delivery and public policy implementations (Qiao et al., 2009; Short, 1992).
Although it is possible to question the results of granting preferences, a NASPO
survey conducted in 2012 nevertheless found that 25 states provide in-state preference
policies for local vendors and/or local products. This research focuses on the in-state
preference policies of South Carolina, one of the states identified in the NASPO survey.
The South Carolina General Assembly rewrote the previous law about in-state
preferences and provided expanded legal authority to the state government to use
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preference policies. "The General Assembly finds that it is crucial to this state's
economic recovery to purchase goods manufactured and produced in the State,
maintain the circulation of the funds of the citizens of this State within this State, and
encourage and facilitate job development and economic growth" (2009 Act No. 72, p.
3).
According to Act No. 72 enacted by the South Carolina General Assembly,
vendors should request the in-state preference for solicitation and provide documents
to prove that they qualify for the preferences. South Carolina has tw o types of
preferences: commodity contract preferences and service contract preferences. The
commodity contract preferences include United States end-product preference (USEPP),
South Carolina end-product preference (SCEPP), and resident vendor preference (RVP).
The commodity contract preferences apply to specific end-products and require
companies to m eet specific requirements. For example, the 2009 Act No.72 stipulates
that to apply for the RVP, the vendors must maintain an office or location in South
Carolina at the tim e of the bid. In addition to maintaining an office, vendors should
meet other criteria such as having either an inventory of commodities on which the
award will be made with a value of fifty thousand dollars [$50,000] or an amount equal
to the annual amount of the contract or having a manufacturer headquartered in South
Carolina with an annual payroll of at least one million dollars (2009 Act No. 72). To
qualify for the SCEPP, vendors should bid a South Carolina end-product, and to qualify
for USEPP, vendors should bid a U.S. end-product. U.S. or South Carolina end-product
means that products must have been manufactured or grown in the United States of
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America or in South Carolina. After determining the eligibility requirem ent to receive
the preference, the procurement officer lowers the price for that line item before
comparing the price to other vendors. Subsequently, the price is decreased by a certain
percentage depending on the preferences for which the bidder qualifies. This is done for
evaluation purposes only. In the end, the lowest bidder wins the bid.
The following summary provided by the South Carolina Budget and Control
Board illustrates the bidding process. "Vendor A and Vendor B both submit bids for a
single line item of equipment. Vendor A bids $12,000. Vendor B bids $11,500. Vendor
A's equipment qualifies for the SCEPP. Vendor B's equipment does not. For purposes of
evaluation, Vendor A's price will be decreased by seven percent (7%), down to
$11,160.00. Vendor A wins the bid and the South Carolina government pays the $12,000
to vendor A" (South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 2009, para 29-30). If the
vendors qualify for more than one type of preference, the cumulative amount is capped
not to exceed a certain amount. Essentially, there are tw o types of caps. One of the caps
refers to the cumulative benefit of all preferences applied to the price of a line item and
is capped not to exceed ten percent (10%) or $500,000 for a single award. The second
type limits the amount of the cap to $50,000 for a single award with a total potential
value in excess of $500,000.
In addition to the commodity/product contract preferences, the state offers
contract preferences for services that are designated as resident contractor preference
(RCP) and resident subcontractor preference (RSCP). Like the preferences mentioned
above, vendors must also m eet certain requirements in order to qualify for either of
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these contract preferences. To qualify for the RCP, a vendor must "maintain an office" in
South Carolina, hire employees "domiciled" in the state and have labor costs that
exceed fifty percent of the total bid price. The requirement to qualify for the resident
subcontractor preference (RSCPs) is far more stringent than for RCP. To qualify for RSCP,
a vendor must "have a documented commitm ent from a single proposed first-tier
subcontractor to perform some portion of the services expressly required by the
solicitation", hire employees "domiciled" in the state, have vendor labor costs exceeding
twenty percent of the total bid price, and "identify the subcontractor that will perform
the work, the work the subcontractor is to perform, and [the] factual basis for
concluding that the subcontractor's work constitutes the required percentage of the
work to be performed in the procurement" (South Carolina Budget and Control Board,
2009, para 37). A summary of the percentages for each type of preference is presented
in Table (2.2) below.

Table (2.2): Percentage Preference
Preference

Percentage Preference

USEPP

2%

SCEPP

7%

RVP

7%

RCP

7%

RSCP-2%

2% (each sub)

RSCP-4%

4% (each sub)

Source: South Carolina Budget and Control Board
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After an extensive survey o f the literature, the researcher found that there is a
lack of studies attem pting to show the relationship between procurement preference
policies and economic benefits at the state and local level. Only a few relevant studies
were identified in the literature. In 1996, economist Hefner conducted research in the
context of the state of South Carolina. In his study, Hefner (1996) sought to measure the
economic impact of not applying procurement preference to a concrete pipes contract
in the state of South Carolina. The concrete pipes award was challenged on a legal basis
in the court. By using the Regional Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS II), Hefner
estimated how many jobs, how much earning (personal incomes), and how much
income taxes (individual, corporate, retail sales taxes) the state economy would lose if
the preference was not implemented. The results showed that South Carolina's
economy would lose 27 job opportunities, $650,000 in personal income and $32,500 in
income taxes. He concluded that awarding the contract by implementing the policy
would help the state economy.
In another study involving a case in South Carolina, Lowenstein (2011) provided
an extensive overview of preference policies in Horry County, South Carolina. By
employing the economic background and rationale for the preference policies,
Lowenstein introduced a fram ework that shows how local preference would be applied
in the county. Using the economic multiplier for Horry County and assuming that 90% of
government purchases are local, Lowenstein concluded that "a local purchasing
preference could potentially generate nearly $158 million in economic activity,
creating/retaining a minimum of 160 jobs" (Lowenstein, 2011, p. 53).
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A further study discussing preference policies and economic benefits was done
by Jensen (2011). Using qualitative data, he investigated how North Carolina's local
governments practice preferences and also extended the study to neighboring states
(South Carolina and Georgia) to review their preference policies. Combining and
analyzing data from surveys, phone interviews, and documents, the analysis showed a
variety of findings. First, North Carolina local governments have no formal local
preference policies, although they do practice informal local preferences. Second, when
participants were asked why their local governments practice preferences, "promotion
of local businesses was the most frequently cited answer. Following was job creation,
increased tax base, sustainability and wealth creation" (Jensen, 2011, p. 3 ). Finally, in
regard to the neighboring states, Jensen's results showed that South Carolina and
Georgia practice local preferences formally and apply them differently from North
Carolina.
In addition to the previous studies specific to South and North Carolina, the
literature review showed several studies that have examined the benefits of local
business to the economy within their jurisdictions. For example, Rodriguez and Houston
(2007) compared the impact of Wist Office Products (Wist) and Office Max Contract
(Office Max) on the economy of the state of Arizona. Both businesses represent
different degrees of locality. Wist is described to be "a true local supplier" (Rodriguez &
Houston, 2007, p. 10) because all the offices, employees, warehouse, distribution, and
administration are local, but Office Max has only a warehouse and small staff locally.
Labor, profit, procurement, and charity represented the four elements to calculate how
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much money was kept in the state economy. According to the findings, 33.4% of Wist's
total revenue remains in the local economy, but 11.6% of Office Max's total revenue
remains. The study concluded that:

Local suppliers generate dramatically greater economic activity than their chain
competitors. In the case at hand, using the most locally invested of the national
chain suppliers, one with a sizeable physical presence in the Phoenix area, the
local firm generates nearly three times the economic impact (Civic Economics,
2007, p. 12).

In another study undertaken by Civic Economics Center, the researchers
analyzed the economic impact of local businesses in Grand Rapids, Michigan. They
concluded that 10% increases in consumer purchasing to local business would add
approximately $140 million in new economic activity, generate over 1600 new jobs, and
provide over $50 million in new wages.
The literature also revealed that some studies focused on other aspects related
to procurement preference policies. For example, researchers have studied the impact
of preferences on government procurement costs, on the bidding behavior of vendors,
and on participation decisions of vendors (Baldwin & Richardson, 1972; De Silva, Dunne,
Kosmopoulou, & Lamarche, 2011; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2008; Marion, 2007; McAfee
& McMillan, 1989; Trionfetti, 2000).
The arguments for and against preferences policies offer conflicting but powerful
arguments. Each approach has sought to inform state procurement preference policies,
but the debates continue. Research can help to confirm if the procurement preferential
policies achieve the desired economic goals. As the review of the literature indicates,
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some state governments have used procurement preference policies to stimulate the
economy and expand the tax bases. One such state is South Carolina, and this study
seeks to examine the impact of South Carolina's procurement preference policies on the
economy of the state.
The first part of this chapter presented an overview of international trade
literature and discussed a variety of protectionist policies. The second part of this
chapter focused on the preference policies implemented by the state of South Carolina.
The next chapter will propose the methodology for this research.
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CHAPTER III
Methodology

Research has shown that many states exert considerable effort to affect social
and economic objectives through procurement policies such as in-state preference
policies (NASPO, 2012). According to NASPO (2012), there are 25 states including South
Carolina that have provided in-state preference for state vendors and/or state products.
South Carolina has implemented the in-state preference policies to help the state
recover from its economic crisis (2009 Act No. 72). This research employs the Regional
Economic Models, Inc. (REMI) Policy Insight (PI+) Model to estimate the impact of South
Carolina's in-state preference policies on the economy of the state for the years 2010
through 2017. This chapter presents an overview of the model, description of the
model, REMI simulation model, data, and a detailed description of the REMI model.

Overview of the Model

This section describes the rationales and justifications fo r the selection of the
Regional Economic Models, Inc. (REMI) Policy Insight (PI+) Model to answer the
proposed research question, which is what are the impacts o f implementing the in-state
procurement preference policies on the economy o f the state o f South Carolina? PI+
involves the use of a simulation model that has been utilized by researchers for over
thirty years to conduct economic impact analysis. PI+ provides quantifiable results with
numerical values to answer the research question.
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There are several compelling reasons for selecting the REMI PI+ model for this
research. One of the main reasons for selecting REMI PI+ is because it integrates the
three models that economists have used to study the impact of either adding or
eliminating protectionist instruments (i.e. tariffs and non-tariffs) within the trade
theory. Since trade theory was used as an overarching theory in this research, it seemed
appropriate to select REMI as a research tool. A review of the trade literature reveals
that the three models are: input-output models (Deardorff & Stern, 1981; Lowinger,
1976), supply-demand equations (Baldwin, 1982; Baldwin & Richardson, 1972; Breton &
Salmon, 1996; Herander, 1982), and computable general equilibrium model (Deardorff
& Stern, 1981). These models consist of embedded mathematical equations that explain
the relationships and the linkages among a variety of economic variables. A "run" or
simulation of these models represents a "shock" to the economy such as imposing a
tariff. The embedded relationships within these models trace the economic impacts
generated by the shock and provide quantifiable values for the impacts.
A second reason for selecting this model is that the research question of this
research aligns closely with the stated goals of REMI PI+. One of the main goals of REMI
PI+ is "understanding how government actions...affect the world around us" (REMI, n.d.,
p. 2). More specifically, the goal is to help "government decision-makers [to] test the
economic effects of their policies" (REMI, n.d., p. 2). Given these similarities, the REMI
PI+ seemed an appropriate model to use.
The third reason for choosing the REMI PI+ model is that it can be customized for
any specific geographic region such as a state, county or city. In this research, REMI PI+
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will be customized for the state of South Carolina. Repeatability is the final reason for
selecting the REMI PI+. The repeated use of the model for economic impact analysis
establishes confidence over time and adds more reliability to the model to conduct this
analysis (Cassing & Giarratani, 1992). PI+ has been in existence fo r more than 30 years
and has been used in a wide variety of situations by many scholars, researchers,
practitioners and professionals from several private, public and nonprofit organizations.
The model simulations in PI+ are also used to assess "economic and demographic
effects in wide-ranging initiatives such as: economic impact analysis; policies and
programs for economic development, infrastructure, environment, energy and natural
resources; and state and local tax changes" (REMI, 2012, para 2). The findings from
these studies w ere published in various journals such as the American Economic Review,
the Review o f Economic Statistics, the Journal o f Regional Science, and the International
Regional Science Review (REMI, 2012).
Researchers have examined the validity of the REMI model in a variety of
scholarly works (Cassing & Giarratani, 1992; Rose, Wei, & Dormady, 2011; Treyz,
Rickman, & Shao, 1991). To validate the estimation ability of the model, Cassing and
Giarratani (1992) calculated the post-sample period forecasts for all fifty states and
Washington, D.C. by using actual historical values. The Mean Absolute Percentage Error
(MAPE) was then calculated to represent the difference between the predicted values
and the actual values, and the results showed "that the REMI model produces very good
forecasts over a short period of tim e beyond the historical data sample. As expected for
all forecasting models, prediction accuracy deteriorates as the forecasting period
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lengthens. Studies also indicated that REMI can predict major changes in the direction of
economic activity for larger industries" (Rose et al., 2011, p. 359). By using multivariate
econometric analysis, Rose et al. (2011, p. 358) evaluated "the explanatory power of the
REMI model and consistency of its output with regard to policy variables". The analysis
"confirm[s] the close proximity between the combination of direct and indirect
macroeconomic impacts and the direct impact assessments of stakeholders...the results
represent a strong validation of the application of the REMI model to the analysis in this
paper" (Rose et al., 2011, p. 374). Moreover, Rickman and Schwer (1995) compared the
multipliers of the REMI model with two other input-output models, the Impact Analysis
for Planning (IMPLAN) and the Regional Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS II). To
compare the three models, the authors created benchmarked versions of the three
models to account for the difference in techniques used to calculate national inputoutput coefficients. The results showed that there is no significant difference among the
multipliers for the three models. Rickman and Schwer suggested that this conclusion
could help researchers and practitioners to be more confident in using ready-made
models in their research.
At the state level, the REMI model is used because it is "the most widely used
state-level economic modeling software package in the U.S." (Rose, Wei, & Prager,
2010, p. 9). Almost every state government agency has applied a REMI Model (Rose et
al., 2010). Some of these states are: Florida, Pennsylvania, Michigan, California and New
Mexico. In Florida, the model was used to investigate the impacts of the Florida Energy
and Climate Change Action Plan (FECCAP) on the state's economy (Rose & Wei, 2012)
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while in Michigan, the model was used to analyze the macroeconomic impact of the
Michigan Climate Action Plan (Miller, Wei, & Rose, 2010). Pennsylvania used the model
to evaluate the impacts of the Pennsylvania Climate Action Plan on the state's economy
for the period of 2 0 0 9 -2 0 2 0 (Rose et al., 2011).
Although REMI PI+ is a commonly used model, it has some limitations. First, as is
the case with other economic impact models, it is possible that REMI could be viewed as
a black box by those who are not familiar with the model. However, to withstand this
limitation REMI Inc. has provided documents on their website to review all assumptions,
equations and data sources. The second limitation is that REMI PI+ is not capable of
providing tax revenue as a separate output; thus, the researcher cannot capture the
impact of tax revenue on the state economy. Third, REMI PI+ can estimate the economic
impacts for only three consecutive years (2010 - 2012) because o f the way the model is
built. The model does not run simulations in years with actual historical data, and the
last year of historical data is 2009.
In spite of the limitations noted above, the REMI model estimates the impact of
in-state preference policies by measuring the most commonly reported economic
indicators: output (sales), employment, personal income, real disposable personal
income, Gross State Product (GSP), and state's population. Output, which can be
thought of as sales, is measured by the amount of production sold to the intermediate
and final consumers. Employment is the total number of full-tim e and part-time jobs in
government and the private sector. Private sector employment is determined by the
value added which represents the difference between output and intermediate inputs
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by industry. Income represents the sum of income that is received by all persons from
all sources. GSP is a comprehensive measure of economic activity in a state. Population
is the difference between the net natural change (caused by births and deaths) and the
migration change (REMI, 2011). Because the REMI model is grounded in neoclassical
economics, the anticipated impacts included are: additional jobs as a result of
implementing the policy, an increase in labor personnel and real disposable income, an
increase in the state's population, and an increase in output (sales) that local businesses
experience as a result of the government buying their products or services.

Description of the Model

The PI+ is flexible and can be customized to account for geographic or regional
differences in assessing the impacts of economic changes in the target states, cities
and/or localities (Avalos & Birdyshaw, 2007). In this case, PI+ is customized to be a
mathematical representation of the South Carolina economy to investigate the impact
of implementing the procurement preference policies. The dollar amount of the
preference contracts (industry sales) are input into the PI+ which calculates the total
changes in output due to the policy changes resulting from the im plementation of the
in-state preference policy.
PI+ uses simulation equations and economic variables. The number of equations
varies depending on "the extent of industry, demographic, demand, and other details in
the specific model being used" (REMI, 2007, p. 3). The model integrates four
methodological approaches: input-output, computable general equilibrium,
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econometric and economic geography methodologies. Each one of these
methodological approaches has its own strengths and weaknesses if used alone;
however, the REMI model combines the strengths of each of these approaches into the
model (REMI, 2007). The four approaches are explained below.
First: input-output model. The REMI model represents "the inter-industry
relationships found in input-output models. Changes that affect industry sectors that
are highly interconnected to the rest of the economy will often have a greater economic
impact than those for industries that are not closely linked to the regional economy"
(REMI, 2012, para 2).
Second: computable general equilibrium. General equilibrium focuses on the
balance between supply and demand in an economy with many interacting markets.
The balance occurs in the long run when prices, production, consumption, imports,
exports, and other changes are in equilibrium and stabilize the economy. "For example,
if real wages in a region rise relative to the U.S., this will tend to attract economic
migrants to the region until relative real wage rates equalize". The purpose of general
equilibrium theory is to help "evaluate changes such as tax policies that may have an
effect on regional prices and competitiveness" (REMI, 2012, para 3).
Third: econometric model. Econometric model is a tool that economists and
researchers use "to forecast future developments in the economy" (Hymans, 2008, para
1). In this model, past relationships among variables are estimated to predict "how
changes in some variables will affect the future course of others" (Hymans, 2008, para

1 ).
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Fourth: economic geography model.
The new economic geography features represent the spatial dimension of the
economy. Transportation costs and accessibility are im portant economic
determinants of interregional trade and the productivity benefits that occur due
to industry clustering and labor market access. Firms benefit from having access
to a large, specialized labor pool and from having access to specialized
interm ediate inputs from supplying firms. The productivity and competitiveness
benefits of labor and industry concentrations are called agglomeration
economies, and are modeled in the economic geography equations (REMI, 2012,
para 5).
As shown in Chart 1.1 (page 16), the overall structure of the REMI model consists
of five major blocks with each block consisting of several economic variables.
Connections among the variables in each block are represented as linkages within and
between the five blocks. The blocks and the variables are:
•

Output and demand block (B l) - includes output, consumption, investment,
government spending, real disposable income and export concepts

•

Labor and capital demand block (B2) - includes labor productivity, labor
intensity, and the optimal capital stocks.
Population and labor force block (B3) - includes population, migration,
participation rate, and labor force.

•
•

•

Compensation, prices, and costs block (B4) - includes delivered prices,
production costs, equipment cost, the consumption deflator, consumer prices,
the price of housing, and the wage equation
M arket shares block (B5) - includes the proportion of local and export markets
that are captured by each industry.

REMI Simulation

Chart 3.1 illustrates how the policy simulation in the REMI PI+ model works. As
shown in the figure, a series of steps must be taken to run the simulation. First, the
researcher formulates the policy question, which in this case is "what are the economic
impacts of implementing the in-state preference policies?". Second, the researcher
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determines the external variable that represents the effects of the policy (in this case,
sales that represent the dollar value for the procurement contract). By using the
baseline value for the variables, the model creates the control forecast (the regional
forecast). To create the control forecast, REMI PI+ employs the recent available data (i.e.
2009) for the South Carolina region. Third, the researcher puts the data into the model
through the policy variable industry sales, which represent the direct effect of the sales
variable on the economy of the state. Fourth, the model generates an alternative
forecast. Finally, the impact of the policy variable is measured by comparing the
alternative and the control forecasts.

Chart (3.1) Policy Simulation

W h a t e ffe c t
w o u ld P o lic y
X have?

C ha n g as in
p o lic y v a ria b le s
a ssocia te d
P o lic y X

B a s a lin a va lu e s
fo r a il p o lic y
v a ria b le s

Source: REMI (2011)
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Data

The case of South Carolina's preference policies for the years 2010 through 2017
will be the focus of this research. The selection of the state of South Carolina is dictated
by data availability. The period of this research is eight years; th e dollar value of
procurement contracts for the first three years (2010 -2012) will be input into the PI+.
REMI cannot run simulations for more than three years in the past because the model
cannot run simulations in years that have historical data. The Pl+'s last year of history is
2009. There is a tw o-year lag in the procurement contracts data because the year must
first end, and then it takes another year for the sources to compile and report the data.
The average spending will be calculated and used to forecast the economic impact for
the years 2013- 2017.

The researcher will employ tw o types of data in this research. The first type of
data to be used includes the values of the economic variables, which are represented in
all the underlying economic linkages, equations and estimated relationships of the
economic structure in the PI+. These relationships and linkages are built into the
software, and REMI staff will develop the model and provide the economic data which it
gathers from various sources. REMI collects primary historical data from various sources
including the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
and County Business Patterns (CBP); its national forecast data is collected from BLS
(forecast data and occupation data) and Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics
(RSQE) from the University of Michigan.
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In addition to the data set described above, the second type of data the
researcher will use includes the dollar values of the contracts awarded to South Carolina
firms given the in-state preference policy. For each contract, the spending (the dollar
value of the contracts) is compiled into the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) to account for the differential impacts by type of sector, and these
dollar values will be input into the PI+. The preference data is obtained from the Office
of Audit and Certification, a subdivision of the Procurement Services Office in South
Carolina Budget and Control Board, which is the central administrative agency for South
Carolina state government. The Office of Audit and Certification prepared quarterly
procurement preference reports which provided the dollar amount of the procurement
preference contracts.

Each of the quarterly reports also includes the name of the South Carolina
agencies that have awarded the contracts, the solicitation numbers, descriptions, NIGP
commodity codes, lowest response amount, award amount, preference expenses, and
preference categories. All procurement contracts involved the use of invitations for
competitive sealed bids. The contracts are classified into the following categories: the
United States end-product preference, South Carolina end-product preference, and
resident vendor preference. In addition to the com modity/product contract
preferences, the state offers contract preferences for services th a t are designated as
resident contractor preference and resident subcontractor preference (more details
about the categories are provided in Chapter II).
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Table 3.1 below represents the combined data from the quarterly reports. The
table shows that in the 2010 fiscal year, 20 competitive sealed bids were awarded by
agencies in the state of South Carolina using preference policies for a total of
$1,031,605, while in the 2011 fiscal year 49 competitive sealed bids were awarded by
agencies in the state of South Carolina using preference policies for a total of
$1,748,391. In the 2012 fiscal year, 49 competitive sealed bids were awarded by
agencies in the state of South Carolina using preference policies for a total of
$1,519,655. The dollar value of each of the 118 contracts will be input in the model
according to the respective North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
industry for each contract. The table also shows that the direct cost of awarding the
preference contracts is $179,332, meaning that the state agencies paid an extra
$179,332 to award the contracts based on a variety of preference types. Thirty state
agencies implemented the in-state preference policies during 2010 and 2012. A list of
the state agencies is provided in Appendix A.

Table 3.1 Total Number of Contracts Dictated
by Preferences and the Preference Cost
Year

Lowest
Response

Award
Amount

Preference
Cost

Number of
Contracts

2010

$996,375

$1,031,605

$35,230

20

2011

$1,670,035

$1,748,391

$78,355

49

2012

$1,448,731

$1,519,655

$70,924

49

Total

$4,484,834

$4,664,166

$179,332

118
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A Detailed Description of the REMI Model

A South Carolina version of the REMI P1+ model was applied to estimate the
economic impacts of preference policies on output, personal and real disposable
income, value added, Gross State Product (GSP), population, and employment in South
Carolina for 2010 and 2017. Each of the five major blocks is summarized below.

1.

Output and Demand (B l)

Chart (3.2): Block 1 Output and Demand
(1) Output Block
10. Change in Local Supply

8. Commodity
Access Index

Population
(Block 3)
2.

Population
(BloekS)

C onsum ption

7. Interm ediate
inputs

9. Interm ediate Input
P ro d u c tiv ity

Consumer
Prices
(Block 4)
1. Real
D isposable
Income

8. Output

S. State and Local
G overnm ent Spending

Wage Rate
(Block 4)
3.

Optimal vs,
Actual Capital
Stock (Block 21

International
E xport

4. Investm ent

Hot Shown
Share o f
Domestic
Markets
(Block 4)

Share of
International
Markets
(Block 4)

Employment
(Block 2)

Commuter Income
or Outflow,
Property, Income,
Transfers, Taxes,
Social Security
Payments

Source: REMI (2011)
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The output and demand block (Chart 3.2) consists of output, demand,
consumption, investment, government spending, exports, and imports, "as well as
feedback from output change due to the change in the productivity of intermediate
inputs" (REMI, 2011, p. 6). Three variables affect the output for each industry in the
home region: industry demand in all regions in the nation, the home region's share of
each market, and international exports from the region. In block 5, economic geography
methods determine the shares of home and other regions' markets. Final demand
drives the output block. For each industry, the final demand consists of the amount of
output, consumption, investment, and capital demand on that industry (REMI, 2011).
The sources of demand are defined below:
■

Output is the amount of production, including all interm ediate goods purchased as
well as value added (compensation and profit). Output also can be thought of as
sales or supply.

■

Consumption is a function of real disposable income per capita, relative prices,
differential income elasticities, and population. When population increases,
consumption increases.

■

Real disposable income drives consumption, which is determined by compensation
(B4), employment (B2), non-compensation income, and the personal consumption
expenditure price index. Labor income depends on em ployment and the
compensation rate, described in blocks 2 and 4, respectively. Non-compensation
income includes comm uter income, property income, transfers, taxes, and social
security payments (REMI, 2011).
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■

Investment is "the difference between optimal and actual capital stock for
residential, non-residential, and equipment investment" (REMI, 2011, p. 9) and it is
driven by optimal capital stock adjustment process.

■

Government spending is used to provide services for citizens and it is related to
revenue resources. Government spending depends on population (B3), housing
prices (B4), and the overall size of the economy (GRP). "The government spending
equation takes into account regional differences in per capita and per GSP
government spending, as well as differential government spending levels across
localities within a larger region" (REMI, 2011, p. 9).

■

The demand for the intermediate inputs is driven by "the requirements of
industries that use inputs from other sectors. These inter-industry relationships are
based on the input-output table for the economy" (REMI, 2011, p. 9). The
interm ediate inputs are determined by productivity which is determined by the
commodity access index.
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2.

Labor and Capital Demand (B2)

Chart (3.3): Block 2 Labor and Capital Demand
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The second block (B2) is "the labor and capital demand block" which includes
employment, labor intensity, labor productivity, and the substitution among labor, fuel
and capital (Chart 3.3).
■

Employment includes farm, government, and private non-farm employment.
"Employment in private non-farm industries depends on employment demand
and the number of workers needed to produce a unit of output. The
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employment per dollar of output is driven by the national employment per dollar
of output, the cost of other factors, and the access to specialized workers"
(REMI, 2011, p. 14).
*

Labor productivity for each industry depends on "the availability of workers with
differentiated skills for the occupations used in each industry" which is equal to
the output per employee (output/em ploym ent). Chart 3.3 indicates the
following relationships: labor productivity is driven by industry employment.
Industry employment is driven by occupation employm ent. Occupation
employment is driven by the labor access index by occupation and industry. The
index derives labor productivity.

■

Labor intensity: "is determined by the cost of labor relative to the other factor
inputs, capital and fuel" (REMI, 2011, p. 14). Labor intensity measures the use of
labor relative to other factors.

■

"The substitution between labor, capital, and fuel is based on a Cobb-Douglas
production function, which implies constant factor shares. Labor intensity is
calculated for each industry" (Rose et al., 2010, p. 12).

■

"Demand for capital is driven by the optimal capital stock equation for industries
and for housing. The optimal level of capital is determ ined for non-residential
structures and equipment for each industry. The regional optimal capital stock is
based on the industry size measured in capital-weighted employment terms, the
cost of capital relative to labor, and a measure of the optimal capital stock on the
national level. (REMI, 2011, p. 14).
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■

The optimal level of capital for residential housing is determined by the real
disposable income in the region relative to the nation, the optimal residential
capital stock for the nation, and the price of housing.

3.

Population and Labor Force (B3)

Chart (3.4): Block 3 Population and Labor Supply
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Population, labor force, participation rate, and migration equations are the
components of the third block, "the population and labor supply", as shown in Chart
3.4. Generally, this block gives demographic information about the region and it consists
of the following:
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Population is available by age, gender, and ethnic category, with birth and
survival rates for each group. Populations for every year equal the net natural
change (caused by births and deaths) and the migration change (migration
occurs for economic and non-economic reasons) to the previous year's
population(REMI, 2011).
Migration includes retirement, military, international, and economic migration",
and it varies widely across population groups. It is m easured/ determined by "
the relative real after-tax compensation rate, relative employm ent opportunity,
and consumer access to variety" (REMI, 2011, p. 6). The model assumes that the
changes in migration are not caused by any changing regional economic
conditions.
Labor force includes unemployed and employed workers. Labor force
participation rate is "thus the proportion of each population group that is
working or looking for work" (REMI, 2011, p. 16). Labor supply is determined by
the size and labor force participation rate of each group. 'These participation
rates respond to changes in employment relative to the potential labor force and
to changes in the real after-tax compensation rate. Demand for labor from block
2 and labor force supply from block 3 interact to determ ine compensation
(wage) rates (REMI, 2011).
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4.

Compensation, Prices and Costs (B4)

Chart (3.5): Block 4 Compensation, Prices, and Costs
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The compensation, prices, and costs block (B4) consists of consumer prices,
housing prices, and composite wages and input costs, composite prices, determinants of
production costs, the consumption price deflator, and the compensation equation
(Chart 3.5). Compensation, prices, and costs are "determined by the labor and housing
markets". The labor market is central to the regional economy, and compensation
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differences are the primary source of price and cost differentials between regions"
(REMI, 2011, p. 14). Demand for labor (B2) and labor force supply (B3) interact to
determine compensation rates. Housing prices depend on changes in population density
and changes in real disposable income. The components are discussed below.

■

Composite prices are derived by the production costs of supplying regions,
the effective distance to these regions, and the index of access to the variety
of outputs in the industry relative to the access by other uses of the product
(REMI, 2011).

■

Determinants of production costs are the cost of labor, capital, fuel, and
interm ediate inputs. Labor costs "reflect a productivity adjustment to
account for access to specialized labor, as well as underlying compensation
rates" (REMI, 2011, p. 17). Capital costs include costs of non-residential
structures and equipment, while fuel costs incorporate electricity, natural
gas, and residual fuels.

■

Composite compensation rate is determined by the labor access index from
block 2 as well as the nominal compensation rate.

■

The composite cost of production depends on the productivity-adjusted
compensation rate of the region, costs of structures, equipment, and fuel,
and the delivered price of intermediate inputs (REMI, 2011).

■

"The consumption deflator converts industry prices to prices for
consumption commodities" (REMI, 2011, p. 17).
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Compensation changes are due to changes in the labor supply and demand
conditions and changes in the national compensation rate. Changes in employment
opportunities relative to the labor force and occupational demand changes determine
the compensation rates by industry (REMI, 2011).

5. M arket Shares (B5)
Chart (3.6): Block 5 Market Shares
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The last block is "the market shares block" which includes the proportion of
local, inter-regional, and export markets captured by each region, so the block
represents "the ability of the region to sell its output within the local region, to other
regions in the nation, and to other nations"(REMI, 2011, p. 17). This block is affected by
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three factors: "relative production costs, the estimated price elasticity of demand, and
the effective distance between the home region and each of the other regions" (REMI,
2011, p. 18). Change in a product's quantity (output) and price (production cost)
compared with other competitors drives the change in share of a specific area in any
region (Chart 3.6).
W hen prices increase (production cost), market shares will be lower. A higher
quantity (output) raises market shares. "Market shares rise with output increases, since
higher output is better able to m eet local and other regions' demand for goods and
services by providing more choices". "The share of local and external markets then
drives the exports from and imports to the home economy" (REMI, 2011, p. 18).
This chapter discussed the rationales for choosing REMI PI+ to estimate the
impact of South Carolina's in-state preference policies on the economy of the state. In
addition, the chapter presented a description of the data to be analyzed as well as the
model and its relationships.
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Chapter IV
Results

Chapter III presented an overview of the REMI model, a REMI simulation, data,
and a detailed description of the REMI model. The purpose of Chapter IV is to present
the data analysis and report the results. This chapter is divided into five sections: data
preparation, profiles of state government agencies, industries benefiting from
procurement contracts, preference types, and economic impact results. The chapter
concludes w ith a summary of the information presented.

Data Preparation

The procurement contracts awarded to South Carolina firms given the in-state
preference policy w ere carefully examined in detail to prepare the data for the analysis.
The total number of the contracts was 124, but 6 contracts were dropped from the data
because 1) the available data was not sufficient to identify the correct industry, 2) a
public purchasing officer deemed the data provided on the preference reports was not
accurate or 3) the dollar value of the contracts was very low (m ore details regarding
these cases are provided in Appendix B).
Prior to inputting the dollar values of the 118 contracts into the REMI model, the
dollar value (the spending) for each contract was classified into th e North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS). The purpose of the classification is to account for

the differential economic impacts on output (business sales), total employment
(includes the private non-farm employment), personal income, real disposable personal
income, Gross State Product (GSP), value added, and state's population by the type of
industry. To identify the respective industry, the South Carolina Procurement Services
Office provided the following data: the solicitation numbers, the solicitation
descriptions, the National Institute of Governmental Purchasing (NIGP) commodity
codes, and preference categories.
The appropriate NAICS industry was identified in three ways. First, the
description of each contract was compared with the detailed description of the NAICS
numbering system provided on the NAICS website. The two descriptions were then
matched to identify the most appropriate industry code. Second, since the
corresponding NIGP code for every contract is provided, the NIGP code staff helped to
convert the NIGP codes to NAICS codes. Third, the NIGP code staff provided the
researcher online access to the description of NIGP codes to help identifying NAICS.
After identifying the appropriate NAICS industry, the researcher reviewed each
contract's description and matched it with the description of NIGP codes. The NIGP
codes were then matched with the NAICS codes. During the process of identifying the
NAICS codes, the type of preference that the state agency applied to every contract was
taken into consideration. For example, if the preference type is resident vendor
preference, the sales from the specific contract contribute to the wholesale trade
industry or retail industry. But, if the preference type is resident vendor and South
Carolina end-product, the sales from the specific contract contribute to the
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manufacturing industry because the product is manufactured in the state of South
Carolina.
After identifying the NAICS by each approach, the corresponding NAICS codes
were compared. In a few cases, there were disagreements on the identified NAICS
codes. In these cases, the researcher checked the South Carolina Budget and Control
Board website to find more details about the specific solicitations. If the information
was not available on the website, the researcher either emailed or called the state
agency that awarded the contracts, provided the solicitation numbers and asked for
more details about the specific contract to help determine the appropriate industry.
(Appendix C includes additional information regarding these cases.)

Profile of State Government Agencies

There are ninety-five state agencies in the government of the state of South
Carolina. These agencies represent a variety of organizations, such as educational
institutions like Clemson University and the University of South Carolina, government
departments such as the Department of Transportation and the Department of Parks,
Recreation and Tourism, and commissions like the Public Service Commission and Arts
Commission. Nearly 30% of the state agencies implemented the in-state preference
policies within the period of 2010-2012. The types of preferences include Resident
Vendor, South Carolina End Product, Resident Vendor and South Carolina End Product,
Resident Vendor and US End Product, Resident Contractor, and Resident Contractor and
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Subcontractor(s). The next section provides more information about the percentages of
each type of preference policy implemented by the state agencies.
Chart 4.1 identifies the names of the top thirteen state agencies that
implemented the preference policies. For the most part, vendors claimed a variety of
preferences when they bid on higher education institutions' contracts. For example,
Clemson University bought fire equipment and protective gear, a Polaris Ranger Vehicle,
and materials for repairing a floor. The University of South Carolina installed computer
servers, provided a switchgear for the Eugene Stone Stadium, and bought surveillance
cameras for the Law Enforcement and Safety Department. Lander University bought
emergency phone towers for campus and mattresses for residence halls, and printed
view books for their colleges. Coastal Carolina University bought treadmills and
requested landscaping services and printing of the winter issue of the alumni magazine.
In addition to higher education institutions, other government agencies
implemented the state preference policies within the period of 2010-2012. The
Transportation Departm ent awarded a contract to buy safety vests, total stations, and
multimeters; the Public Safety Department awarded a contract to a resident vendor to
provide janitorial services and to buy golf carts; the Parks, Recreation and Tourism
Department awarded a contract based on resident vendor and South Carolina product
to buy heat pumps for Givhans Ferry State Park and playground equipment for Lake
W ateree State Park; the South Carolina Departm ent of Juvenile Justice awarded a
resident contractor a solicitation for maintenance and repair of generators.
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Chart (4.1): State Agencies that Implemented the In-State Preference Policies (2010-2012)
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Profile of Preference Types
Chart 4.2 shows the type of preference policies that vendors claimed when
South Carolina agencies sent invitations for bid within the three-year period from 20102012. As mentioned in Chapter II, South Carolina has two types of preferences:
commodity contract preferences and service contract preferences. The commodity
contract preferences are the preferences claimed by South Carolina vendors because
they sell or manufacture a product in the state. The service contract preferences are
preferences claimed by South Carolina vendors because they provide services in the
state. The commodity contract preferences include the United States end-product
preference, South Carolina end-product preference, and resident vendor preference. In
addition to the commodity/product contract preferences, the state offers contract
preferences for services that are designated as resident contractor preference and
resident subcontractor preference. As shown in Chart 4.2, thirty-four percent of the
vendors claimed that they qualified for resident vendor and South Carolina end-product
preference, which means that their products are sold by South Carolina vendors and are
made, manufactured, or grown in South Carolina. Twenty-seven percent of the vendors
proved that they qualified for resident vendor preference policy. Twenty-seven percent
represents 28 contracts awarded to South Carolina vendors. Twenty-nine percent of the
contracts were awarded based on resident vendor and US end product. Chart 4.2 also
shows that there were few contracts (less than 6% of the contracts) awarded based on
resident contractors and subcontractors preferences and South Carolina end-product
preferences.
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Chart (4.2): Type of Preference Policies
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Profile o f Industries Benefiting from Procurem ent Contracts

As mentioned before, the dollar values of the contracts w ere assigned according
to the NAICS codes. After identifying the corresponding NAICS industries for the 118
contracts, eight industries that benefited from the procurement contracts that were
awarded based on preference policies were identified. Table 4.1 (page 77) shows the
names of the eight industries, the average of the dollar spending during 2010-2012 and
the number of contracts that were awarded based on the preferences by industry.
(Appendix D includes NAICS descriptions of the industries that w ere involved in this
research). For clarifying purposes, Chart 4.3 (page 78) is also a visual representation of
the dollar values of the top industries benefiting from procurement contracts. The eight
industries are: retail trade, construction, administrative and support services,
manufacturing, wholesale trade, professional, scientific, and technical services,
transportation and warehousing, and other services (except public administration).
As a result of awarding preference contracts, state government agencies spent
the most on the wholesale trade industry (an average of $657,248). According to the
NAICS, "the Wholesale Trade sector comprises establishments engaged in wholesaling
merchandise, generally without transformation, and rendering services incidental to the
sale of merchandise" (NAICS, 2013, par 4). For example, in 2010, the Transportation
Department awarded a contract to a South Carolina vendor to buy safety vests. The
extra sales from the safety vests contributed to the wholesale trade industry. In 2012,
Lander University awarded a nearly $18,000 contract to a South Carolina vendor to buy
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theater lighting fixtures and lamps. The $18,000 sale added to the wholesale industry.
The University of South Carolina bought cameras for its Law Enforcement and Safety
Department from a resident vendor for $29,000. A total of forty-one contracts (35%)
were attributed to the wholesale trade industry within the three-year period.
The second highest sector benefiting from procurement contracts is the
manufacturing sector. Forty-two contracts were awarded to buy a South Carolina endproduct that was made, manufactured, or grown in South Carolina. According to the
South Carolina Procurement Office, "Made means to assemble, fabricate, or process
component parts into an end product, the value of which, assembly, fabrication, or
processing is a substantial portion of the price of the end product. Manufactured means
to make or process raw materials into an end product. Grown means to produce,
cultivate, raise, or harvest timber, agricultural produce, or livestock on the land, or to
cultivate, raise, catch, or harvest products or food from the w ater which results in an
end product that is locally derived from the product cultivated, raised, caught, or
harvested"(South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 2009, p. 2).
Chart 4.4 (page 79) shows the names of the twelve manufacturing sectors and
the percentage of total number of contracts that contributed to the various
manufacturing industries. The twelve sectors are: miscellaneous manufacturing, printing
and related support activities, computer and electronic product manufacturing,
electrical equipm ent and appliance manufacturing, machinery manufacturing, furniture
and related product manufacturing, other transportation equipment manufacturing,
fabricated metal product manufacturing, primary metal manufacturing, paper
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manufacturing, wood product manufacturing, and petroleum and coal products
manufacturing.
Thirty- nine percent of the manufacturing contracts w ere attributed to the
miscellaneous manufacturing industry. For example, Midlands Technical College
awarded a contract to buy dental workstations and dental equipment. The value of the
contract was nearly $200,000, and it contributed to the dental equipm ent and
instruments manufacturing (miscellaneous manufacturing). The second highest
manufacturing sector benefiting from procurement contracts was printing and related
support activities. The Health and Environmental Control Departm ent hired a resident
vendor to print WIC food guide booklets. The contract, valued at $21,000 ,was
attributed to the printing industry. In 2011, the University of South Carolina awarded a
contract to furnish and deliver Symetrix SymLink digital audio devices for $16,500. The
sales contributed to the computer and electronic product-manufacturing sector. In
another example, in 2011, Francis Marion University bought portable concession stand
stations for $26,304, and this contributed to the furniture and related product
manufacturing.
For the construction industry, state governments awarded 15 contracts that
were based on preference policies for an average of $330,469. The Vocational
Rehabilitation Department awarded a contract to a South Carolina vendor for a loading
dock area and paving improvements/repairs. In this case, the additional sales were
added to the construction industry. In 2011, Juvenile Justice contracted with a resident
contractor for dorm demolition, and this service was considered a contribution to the
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construction industry. The Transportation Department also awarded a $12,000 contract
to a resident vendor to install concrete piles.
In 2011, Trident Technical College awarded a contract to a resident vendor to
buy multimeters for $225, and the dollar value contributed to the retail sector. Coastal
Carolina University awarded a contract to hire a resident contractor for landscaping
services and paid $12,000. This contract contributed to the administrative and support
services industry. Midlands Technical College spent nearly $20,000 for data processing,
computer programming and software services by awarding the contract to a resident
vendor.
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Table (4.1): Profile of Industries Benefiting from Procurement Contracts

Average

Number of

(2010-2012)

the Contracts

Wholesale Trade

$657,248

41

Manufacturing

$412,090

42

Construction

$330,469

15

Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services

$67,122

8

Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services

$55,962

6

Retail Trade

$17,456

3

Other Services (except Public Administration)

$14,897

2

Transportation and Warehousing

$10,994

1

$1,566,239

118

Name of the Industry

Total
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Chart (4.3): The Percentage of Procurement Contracts by Industry
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Chart (4.4) Manufacturing Sector
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The Economic Im pact Results

The researcher used the REMI PI+ 1.5.2, 70-sector, 1-region, model of the South
Carolina economy to perform the impact study of the in-state preference policies. There
are two main steps to study the effect of the preference policies on the economy and to
obtain the results from REMI PI+. First, REMI Inc. developed the South Carolina version
of the REMI PI+ model by using historical, estimated and forecasted data. The South
Carolina REMI PI+ model contains the baseline value for all the economic indicators,
which represents the values of the indicators without implementing the preference
policy. Second, for each contract, the corresponding NAICS industry was determined,
and the dollar values of the contracts were added to the model. Entering the dollar
values of the contracts represents a shock in the economy and creates the alternative
forecast for the model. The alternative forecast represents the value of the economic
indicators when implementing the policy.
For each year, the difference between the baseline value and the alterative
forecast represents the quantitative impact of the in-state preference policies (but
without considering policy costs). If the difference between the baseline value and the
alterative forecast is positive, the preference policies have a positive impact on the
economy. If the difference between the baseline value and the alterative forecast is
negative, the preference policies have a negative impact on the economy. If the
difference between the baseline value and the alterative forecast is zero, the preference
policies have no impact on the economy of South Carolina.
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The study uses seven economic indicators to measure the impact of the
preference policies. These indicators are: total employment (includes the private non
farm employment), output (business sales), value added, Gross State Product (GSP),
personal income, real disposable personal income, and state's population.
After running the simulation, which is presented in detail in Chapter III, the
results can be viewed in three different formats in the model. Each form at represents a
unique way to read the results. The discussion below consists of a combination of the
three formats.

1.

Difference: viewed as a numeric difference relative to the other forecast. In this
research, difference represents the numeric difference between the baseline
values (the control forecast) and the alternative forecast. Table 4.2 shows the
results in "Difference" format.

2.

Levels: gives the ability to view the actual numeric values for all the variables in
the model. In this view, the numeric values for all the economic indicators with
and without implementing the preference policies are provided. Charts 4.5, 4.6,
4.8, 4.10-4.14 illustrate the behavior of the main economic indicators. It is critical
to mention that the above charts are drawn using 3-D line formatting, and the 3D rotating is zero for the X and Z axis and ten for the Y axis. Also, the chart
perspective is ten. This type of formatting is used in order to show more clearly
the small economic impacts of the in-state preference policies on the state
economy.
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3.

Percentage Change: viewed as a percentage change relative to another forecast
(alternative forecast % change compared to control forecast). Chart 4.15 shows
the change in the economic indicators as a percentage of the estimated baseline.

The total quantitative impact of implementing the preference policies on the
economic indicators is shown in Table 4.2. The increase or decrease in employment,
personal income, GSP, output, value added and real disposable income measures the
economic impact. All values in the table are positive which indicates an increase in the
economic indicators as a result of implementing the preference policies. For the
employment variable, the numeric values represent how many extra jobs are added to
the economy. For GSP, output and real disposable income indicators, the numeric values
represent how many extra dollars are added to the economy as a result of
implementing the preference policies. The next section provides more details about
each economic indicator.
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Table (4.2): Difference in Economic Indicators Compared to the Baseline Values

Total of the

Variable

Units

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Total Employment

Jobs

14

18

24

18

17

16

15

14

135

Private Non-Farm

Jobs

12

16

21

16

15

14

13

12

119

Output/ Sale

Millions

1.526

2.289

2.960

2.197

2.106

2.045

1.984

1.953

17.06

Personal Income

Millions

0.595

0.839

1.175

0.961

0.961

0.992

1.007

0.992

7.52

Real Disposable
Personal Income

Millions

0.473

0.626

0.824

0.626

0.671

0.656

0.626

0.641

5.14

Gross State Product

Millions

0.900

1.389

1.724

1.328

1.251

1.221

1.221

1.190

10.22

Value Added

Millions

0.916

1.389

1.724

1.328

1.266

1.236

1.221

1.190

10.27

Population

People

3

7

12

14

16

17

19

19

107

Differences

Employment
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The Economic Indicators

1.

Employment:
REMI PI+ defines employment as "the number of jobs, full-tim e plus part-time,
by place of work. Full-time and part-tim e jobs are counted at equal weight. Employees,
sole proprietors, and active partners are included, but unpaid fam ily workers and
volunteers are not included" (REMI, 2013b, par 44). REMI adapted the Bureau of
Economic Analysis's (BEA) definition of employment. According to the BEA's definition,
the additional jobs "represented the number of "roster slots" available from business or
government at the prevailing wage conditions during a tim e period". So, the definition
of employment is a "labor demanded" concept rather than an idea of "how many
people have a job" at a moment." (REMI, 2013a, p. 11).
Due to the sales increase from implementing in-state preference policies,
employment is anticipated to increase above the baseline. In the REMI PI+ model, sales
(output) and em ploym ent are connected because output influences private non-farm
employment. As shown in Table 4.2, increased sales contributed 1 4 ,1 8 and 24 jobs in
2010, 2011, & 2012 to the economy of the state. The total increase in employment
within the next 5 years (2013- 2017) is 79 job-years greater than the baseline. REMI
estimates that there are 135 more job-years available and occupied than in the baseline
during the 8 years of the study. Table 4.2 also shows that on average more than 80% of
the additional jobs were added to private industries.
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It is critical to emphasize the importance of interpreting the employment results
correctly; the total employment in 2010 is 14 jobs greater than the baseline values.
These jobs might be 14 new jobs starting in 2010 or 14 "more people have a job (when
accounting for people who work multiple jobs or commute in or out of [South Carolina]
for work), but it did mean there was more work in the state to such degree" (REMI,
2013a, p. 11).
Chart 4.5 shows the total employment impact to South Carolina between
implementing and not implementing preference policies. The dashed line shows the
total number of jobs in the state of South Carolina w ithout implementing the preference
policies. The solid line shows the total number of jobs in the state of South Carolina with
implementing the preference policies. When South Carolina government agencies
award preference contracts to South Carolina firms, the sales of the firms increase, and
they need to hire more workers to increase production. For South Carolina the extra
dollars generated additional jobs in the state. Furthermore, Chart 4.6 compares private
non- farm employment before and after implementing the preference policies.
In addition to the number of jobs, the model provides em ployment by industrylevel within the private non-farm sector. Chart 4.7 shows that workers were able to
work in the occupations demanded mainly by the following industries: construction,
manufacturing, retail trade, wholesale trade, professional, scientific, and technical
services, and administrative and waste management services. Twenty-five percent of
the private non-farm jobs are in the construction industry, and 23% of the private non
farm jobs are in the wholesale trade industry.
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Chart (4.5): Employment
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Chart (4.6): Private Non-Farm Employment
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Chart (4.7): Total Jobs by Industry
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Total Output:
Output is "the sum of output for private non-farm industries, state and local
government, federal civilian, federal military, and farm sectors" (REMI, 2013b, par 150).
It is basically the additional sales or total production that was generated within the state
because preference policies were implemented when awarding the contract to state
vendors. The results show that when the contracts were awarded to in-state vendors,
the sales /o u tp u t for some industries increased by $1.5 million in 2010 over the baseline
simulation (the sales without implementing the preference policies), and are predicted
to continue to increase on average by $2.1 million for each year from 2010 until 2017
(see Table 4.2).
Chart 4.8 shows that the output impact for a variety of industries increased after
implementing preference policies. The dashed line shows the total output in the state of
South Carolina w ithout implementing the preference policies. The solid line shows the
total output in the state of South Carolina with implementing the preference policies. In
2012, industry sales were $307,221 billion (the baseline value); after implementing the
preference policies, the output was $307,224 billion. Therefore, the increase was
estimated to be around three million dollars in 2012. The total increase in sales within
the eight-year period is expected to be around $17 million.
As shown in Chart 4.9, the benefits of implementing the preference policies were
concentrated in the industries related to wholesale trade, construction, and
manufacturing. Sales in the wholesale trade industry increased th e most during the
eight years because of implementing the preference policies; it increased by $5.2 million

and represents 33.5% of the sales increase. While manufacturing and construction sales
increased by 25% and 17% respectively during the eight-year period, all other sectors
showed a sales increase of less than 6%. The other industries in Chart 4.9 represent
management of companies and enterprises, arts, entertainm ent and recreation,
educational services, forestry, fishing and related activities, and mining.
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Chart (4.8): Sales/ Output
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Chart (4.9): Sales by Industry
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3. Value Added:
Value added represents " a measure of the contribution of each private industry
and of government to a region's Gross Domestic Product"(REMI, 2013b, par 238). It
represents the difference between industry's gross output (sales, commodity taxes and
inventory change) minus its intermediate inputs (energy, raw materials, semi-finished
goods and services that are purchased from domestic industries or from foreign
resources). Demand affects the value added variable, so the value added variable
increases as a result of an increase in demand. As Table (4.2) shows value added
increased by $.91, $1.4, $1.7, and $1.3 million for the years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
respectively, and increased by $1.2 million for the years 2014-2017. The state gained
$10.27 million in value added when implementing the preference policies.
Chart 4.10 shows the value added variable over the eight-year period. The
dashed line shows the total value added in the state of South Carolina without
implementing the preference policies. The solid line shows the total value added in the
state of South Carolina with implementing the preference policies. The value added
increased on average by $1.3 million yearly. In 2012, the value added baseline was
$172.4546 billion and the alternative forecast was $172.4563 billion, so the difference
between the baseline and the forecast represented the impact of implementing the
preference policies; in this case, the difference for 2012 was $1.7 million.
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Chart (4.10): Value Added
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4.

Gross State Product (GSP):
GSP represents "a comprehensive measure of economic activity in a state, and
can provide important information about regional economic health" (Weber, 1979, p.
217). As Table (4.2) shows, in 2011, the economic impact of the in-state preference
increased South Carolina GSP by $1.4 million. In 2012, the preference policies
contributed $1.7 million to GSP, which equals a 0.15% increase in GSP. When
government awards the contracts to in-state vendors and buys their products, the
demand for the products increases and as a result the GSP increases. The total
estimated impact of the policy on GSP from 2010- 2017 is the summation of the
difference between the baseline values and the alternative forecast values over the
eight years of study. In this case, the sum of the impacts from 2010 through 2017 for
GSP is $10.22 million.
Chart 4.11 shows the GSP impact in South Carolina from implementing the
preference policies. The change in GSP is similar to the change in employment. The
difference between the dashed line (the baseline) and the solid line (the alternative
forecast) represents the impact of the preference policies. W hen South Carolina
government agencies award the preference contract to a South Carolina vendor, the
extra dollars generated a positive impact in the state in terms of GSP.

95

Chart (4.11): Gross State Product
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5.

Personal Income:
Personal Income represents the "Income received by persons from all sources. It
includes income received from participation in production as well as from government
and business transfer payments. It is the sum of compensation of employees (received),
supplements to wages and salaries, proprietors' income with inventory valuation
adjustment (IVA) and capital consumption adjustment (CCAdj), rental income of persons
with CCAdj, personal income receipts on assets, and personal current transfer receipts,
less contributions for government social insurance" (REMI, 2013b, par 154). As Table 4.2
illustrates, on average personal income increased by one million dollars. In total, $7.52
million was added to the economy as a result of implementing the preferences. Chart
4.12 shows the personal income associated with implementing the preference policies
in South Carolina. It follows the same trend as employment. W hen South Carolina
government agencies award a preference contract to a South Carolina vendor, the extra
dollars generate more personal income.

6.

Real Disposable Income:
Real disposable income reflects "total after-tax income received by persons; it is
the income available to persons for spending or saving" (REMI, 2013b, par 169). Since
output increases along with a rise in employment, real disposable personal income is
estimated to increase. As a result of implementing the in-state preference, the annual
real disposable personal income was estimated to increase about $5.14 million during
the years 2010 and 2017 (Table 4.2). Chart 4.13 shows trends similar to the personal
income variable.
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Chart (4.12): Personal Income
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Chart (4.13): Real Disposable Personal Income
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Population:
"Population reflects mid-year estimates of people, including survivors from the
previous year, births, special populations, and three types of migrants (economic,
international, and retired)" (REMI, 2013b, par 158). Workers might relocate if they find a
job with higher wages somewhere else and migrate from one area to another. As Table
(4.2) shows, the population of the state increased by only seven people in 2011 as a
result of implementing the preference policies. W ith tim e, more people might move to
the state; three people moved to the state in 2010 and an additional 19 people are
expected to move in 2017. On average, population is predicted to increase by
approximately 13 people yearly.
Chart 4.14 shows the population of the state variable over the eight-year period.
The dashed line shows the population in the state of South Carolina without
implementing the preference policies. The solid line shows the population of the state
with implementing the preference policies. The population increased on average by 13
people yearly. For example, in 2016, the population is estimated to be 4,850,119 and
the forecast was 4,850,138. The difference between the baseline and the forecast
represents the number of people who might relocate to the state to work in jobs as a
result of implementing the preference policies, and in this case, that is 19 people.
Therefore, along with the economic impacts associated with job growth, income, value
added, and GSP, it is estimated that there would be a small effect on the state's
population.

Chart (4.14): Population
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Chart (4.15) presents the percentage change of the main economic indicators in this
study. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the percentage change for every variable
represents the percentage changes from the baseline values. These percentages indicate the
extent to which the economic indicators increased, decreased, or remained the same as a result
of implementing the preference policies. They also indicate if the impacts on the economy are
considered large or small compared to the baseline. As shown in Table (4.2), implementing the
preference policies contributed positively to the economy of the state. However, as shown in
Chart (4.15), the percentage changes are relatively small.
The trend of the percentage impact is similar for all the economic indicators. The
percentage impact increased in 2010 and 2011 and reached the highest percentage (.001%) in
2014, but then the percentage decreased for all the economic indicators, except for the state's
population, until 2017. For example, the percentage change in employm ent variable was nearly
.0006% in 2010, increased to .001% in 2012 and decreased to .0005% by 2017. Except for the
state's population, the percentage impacts on personal income and real disposable income
were lower than the other economic indicators. The percentage impact was around .0004% for
the eight-year period, except in 2012 when it was around .0006%.
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Chart (4.15): Percentage Change

0.000012

0.00001

•Total Employment

0.000008

•Private Non-Farm Employment
•Gross Domestic Product
•Output
0.000006

•Value Added
• Personal Income
•Real Disposable Personal Income
Population

0.000004

0.000002

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

103

S u m m a ry

The previous sections in this chapter presented the results of this economic
impact study. The impact is measured by the differences in the values of economic
indicators with and without implementing the preference policies. Because the impact
of the preference policies differs by industry, the sales (the dollar value of the contracts)
are compiled into the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), and then
the dollar value of the contracts (output/ sales) awarded to South Carolina firms given
the in-state preference policy was input into the model. REMI reported seven main
economic indicators: employment, output/sales, personal income, real disposable
income, Gross State Product (GSP), value added, and state's population.
As a result of implementing the in-state preference, 135 job-years are estimated
to be added to the South Carolina economy with more than 80% of these jobs added to
the private non-farm industries. Most of the jobs are in the construction (25%),
wholesale trade (23%), and manufacturing (14%) industries. Real disposable personal
income is estimated to increase by $5.14 million between 2010 and 2017, and the South
Carolina economy is estimated to gain $10.22 million in GSP from 2010 through 2017.
Sales are estimated to increase on average by $2.1 million from 2010 through 2017
(total $17 million). The sales benefits were concentrated in industries related to
manufacturing, wholesale trade, construction, and administrative support services. The
state gained $10.27 million in value added when implementing the preference policies.
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Even though these benefits are relatively small compared to the size of South
Carolina's economy, they outweigh the $179,332 of preference costs, which represent
the extra dollars that government pays when they award the contracts based on
preferences. In conclusion, the results showed that the values of the economic
indicators are positive and represent the estimated contributions to the state economy.
Chapter IV presented details of how the sales from 118 contracts were classified
within the NAICS system as well as a detailed explanation of the profiles of state
government agencies, industries benefiting from procurement contracts, and the
various preference types. The chapter concluded with a presentation of the values of
the economic indicators and a summary of the results.
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Chapter V

Conclusion

This research examined the impact of in-state preference policies on the
economy of South Carolina. Chapter IV discussed the data preparation, reported the
profiles of state government agencies, preference types, and industries benefiting from
procurement contracts, and presented the results of the economic impact on the state
economy. The economic impact is measured using seven indicators: output (business
sales), total em ployment (includes the private non-farm em ployment), real disposable
personal income, Gross State Product (GSP), value added, personal income, and state's
population. This chapter reports a summary of the research and the research results and
presents study implications, limitations and delimitations of the study, and future
research.

Summary of the Research

State governments have adopted a variety of procurement preference policies to
achieve a variety of social, political and economic goals. This study focused on the
economic goals by investigating the economic impact of implementing in-state
preference policies on the economy of South Carolina. In-state preference policies
promote state businesses and help them remain in their home state. According to
economic theory, as a result of adding extra money to the economy, the preference
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policies would generate more jobs and an increase in production, sales, income and
population. To investigate the benefits of implementing the preference policies,
international trade theory was used as a guiding fram ework in this study.
Within the context of international trade, governments provide social, political,
and economic arguments to justify their intervention in trade. Reviewing the literature
revealed that the rationale for adopting procurement preference policies in the
domestic context is similar to the rationale presented in support of government
intervention in international trade. A significant amount of research has investigated the
impact that protectionist instruments such as tariffs, import quotas, subsidies, and
formal policies might have on a country's economy and trade, but the results from the
research were not consistent. Deardorff and Stern (1981) and Lowinger (1976) used
input-output models to analyze the impact o f discriminatory policies on the economy of
U.S., U.K. and EU mem ber countries; Baldwin (1982), Breton and Salmon (1996) and
Herander (1982) used supply-demand equations to estimate the impact of the Buy
American Act on imports, output, and domestic prices, and a computable general
equilibrium model was used by Herander (1982) to investigate the impact of
government price discrimination and tariffs. Scholars showed that protectionist
instruments might have some benefits to the economy, but there are costs associated
with these benefits, and most of the time, the benefits are not large enough to
outweigh the costs.
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Within the state context, state governments enact in-state preference policies
hoping to help their own economy by increasing economic growth and bringing
economic benefits to the state. However, there is a lack of research to prove these
economic benefits. This research attem pted to provide empirical evidence by answering
the following research question: what are the impacts of implementing the in-state
procurement preference policies on the economy of the state of South Carolina?
To estimate the economic impact of the South Carolina preference policies on
the state economy, the Regional Economic Model Policy Insight (REMI PI+) was utilized
in this study. REMI PI+ represents a traditional way to measure th e impact of a variety of
policies and programs. REMI PI+ consists of embedded mathematical equations that
explain the relationships and the linkages among a variety of economic variables. The
embedded relationships within these models trace the economic impacts generated by
increasing sales as a result of implementing preference policies.
The REMI model is composed of three main components, which economists have
used separately in impact studies involving international trade. Since trade theory was
used as an overarching theory in this research, it seemed appropriate to select REMI as
a research tool. Moreover, many scholars, researchers, practitioners and professionals
from several private, public and nonprofit organizations have used REMI PI+ for over
thirty years. Scholars have applied REMI to study a variety of policy issues at the state
level. For example, Florida state used the model to investigate the impacts of the Florida
Energy and Climate Change Action Plan (FECCAP) on the state's economy (Rose & Wei,
2012) while in Michigan, the model was used to analyze the macroeconomic impact of
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the Michigan Climate Action Plan (M iller et al., 2010). Pennsylvania used the model to
evaluate the impacts of the Pennsylvania Climate Action Plan on the state's economy for
the period of 2 0 0 9 -2 0 2 0 (Rose et al., 2011). However, although the repeated use of the
model o v ertim e has established confidence in its reliability, there are some limitations
in its use. These limitations are discussed later in this chapter.
In this study, South Carolina's version of the PI+ was applied to analyze the
economic impacts of in-state preference policies on the economy of the state from 2010
through 2012 and to forecast the trends from 2013 to 2017. The overall structure of the
REMI PI+ is divided into five major blocks, namely, output and demand, labor and capital
demand, population and labor force, wages, prices, and profits, and market shares. The
economic impacts were determined by measuring the most commonly reported
economic indicators: output (business sales), total employment (includes the private
non-farm employment), personal income, real disposable personal income, Gross State
Product (GSP), value added, and state's population.
Two types of secondary data were used: 1) the values of the economic variables
which were represented in all the underlying economic linkages, equations and
estimated relationships of the economic structure in the PI+. This data were collected
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and County
Business Patterns. 2) quarterly procurement preference reports. The Procurement
Services Office in South Carolina provided quarterly procurement preference reports
each of which included the names of the South Carolina agencies that have awarded the
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contracts, the solicitation numbers, descriptions, NIGP commodity codes, lowest
response amount, award amount, preference expenses, and preference categories.
To measure the economic indicators, REMI PI+ factors in the specific industry
that each contract complies with, and therefore, the industry sector for each contract
was identified to comply with NAICS. The dollar values of the contracts were added to
the model before the researcher ran the simulation and generated the results. The
results are presented in detail in the previous chapter, and they are presented briefly in
the next section of this chapter.

Summary of the Results

This study assessed the economic impact of in-state preference policies using
REMI PI+. A customized version of REMI PI+ model was developed for the state of South
Carolina. Before running REMI, the researcher analyzed not only the profile of state
government agencies that implement preference policies but also the preference types
that were claimed by the vendors as well as the industries benefiting from procurement
contracts.
Almost 31% of South Carolina government agencies have implemented the
preference policies, and they award contracts mainly to buy products and services
related to wholesale trade, manufacturing, and construction. Vendors, when bidding on
contracts, claimed a variety of preference policies. Thirty-four percent of the vendors
claimed that they qualified for resident vendor and South Carolina end-product
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preference. Twenty-seven percent of the vendors proved that they qualified for the
resident vendor preference policy and twenty-nine percent of the contracts were
awarded based on resident vendor and US end product. Less than 6% of the contracts
were awarded based on resident contractor and subcontractor preferences and South
Carolina end- product preferences.
The results from running the REMI model represent the quantitative difference
between the baseline values and the alternative forecast values. The baseline values
show the numerical values of the economic indicators before implementing the in-state
preference policies. The alternative forecast values show the numerical values of the
economic indicators after implementing the in-state preference policies. The difference
between the baseline forecast and the alternative forecast could be positive, negative,
or zero. If the difference is positive, implementing the in-state preference policies
contributes positively to the state economy. If the difference is negative, implementing
the in-state preference policies hurts the state economy, and if the difference is zero,
implementing the in-state preference policies has no impact on the state economy.
Table (4.2) showed the expected amount of increase in the economic indicators
due to the simulated economic shocks. The shock represents the extra sales that were
added to the economy as a result of implementing the preference policies. The
economic impact of implementing preference policies was $17 million in total industry
output (sales) over 8 years. On average the output increased by $2.1 million from 2010
until 2017. In terms of sales, the wholesale industry's output increased the most
compared with the other industries (34%). The manufacturing and construction
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industries accounted for 25% and 17 % of total sales and the value-added impact was
$10.27 million dollars.

Implementing preference policies also impacted total em ploym ent which
increased by 135 job-years. Eighty percent of those total jobs (119 jobs) were in private
industries, and they mainly appeared in the construction, wholesale trade,
manufacturing, and administrative and waste management industries. The construction
and wholesale trade industries were the largest component in terms of employment (30
jobs and 27 jobs respectively) followed by the manufacturing, and administrative and
waste management industries (17 and 13 jobs respectively). Over 100 people were
predicted to relocate to the state within the next 8 years and should that be the case
there could be a gain of $5.14 million in real disposable personal income.

Policy Implications

The results of this study showed that the numeric values of the economic
indicators, which are GSP, employment, personal income, real disposable income,
state's population, value added, and output, all increased when the state implemented
the in-state preference policies. It is important to discuss the implications of
implementing the preference policies on South Carolina, however, this research does
not support a specific decision related to in-state preference policies for South Carolina.
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The findings have important implications for voters, taxpayers, public
administrators, and policy makers. Voters and taxpayers are concerned about the
effective use of their money by government. They want government to do great things
for them and the society (Dye, 2012). Governments have the obligation to maximize the
use of taxpayers' money, and in the case of in-state preference policies, governments
spend more money when they award these policies. Citizens w ant to be informed about
the impact of paying the extra money and have enough knowledge to understand
government actions. The results from this study can help voters and taxpayers keep an
eye on the impact of preference policies.
Furthermore, policymakers frequently enact policies to address an issue but, not
in all cases, can they predict the consequences of implementing the policy. This study
might help policymakers to confirm the need to continue the policy, to stop
implementing the policy, a n d / or to change the policy to make it more beneficial. The
positive results indicate that the preference policies are beneficial to the state, but the
volume/scale of the impacts could be large or small depending on the cost of
implementing the preference policies. Policymakers and public officials should give
more attention to the costs associated with implementing the preference policies, and
they must find a balance between the benefits and the costs of preference policies since
both issues are legitimate policy concerns.
This research starts the process of filling the gap in the literature by adding
research related to preference policies to the body of knowledge of public procurement.
Scholars confirmed the importance of analyzing preferences on many occasions. Qiao et
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al. (2009, p. 397) mentioned that "the practical impact of preferences is worthy of much
more analysis". Professional organizations and government officials also discussed
preference policies and emphasized the need for more research-based answers to the
benefits of preference policies. For example, "NASPO believes that more research and
cost-benefit analysis studies are warranted to gauge success rates and gains, if any, or
failures of preference programs and policies, including w hether any state has realized
any direct or indirect cost benefit or loss as a result due to a specific preference"
(NASPO, 2012, p. 3). In addition, in its report on in-state preference policy in its
procurements, the Connecticut Department of Administrative Services (2012, p. 6)
stated that "[Preferences data] may be useful in the future in making a determination
as to the economic impact of state contracting and any proposed policy changes in this
area". These statements warn of the emergent need to have more data available
regarding in-state preference policies in order to contribute to a better understanding of
preference policies. This consideration is another implication of this study.
Since the economic impacts of preference policies on the South Carolina
economy are shown by industry-level, the results give state agencies the opportunity to
identify the sectors that state agencies want to support when they implement the
preferences. In conclusion, the results from this study have shown that implementing
preference policies does help the state economy, and the results provide the knowledge
base for policymakers, voters and taxpayers in determining w hether or not to adapt in
state preference policies.

114

Limitations o f the Research

Limitations are the factors that weaken the research and are out of the
researcher's control to a certain extent. Creswell (2005, p. 198) defined limitations as
the "potential weaknesses or problems with the study identified by the researcher". The
researcher acknowledges such limitations to this study because they may have had the
potential to influence the interpretation of the results, and they will be described below.
This research is limited in its results for several reasons. First, the results from
this research cannot be generalized to other states because it focused on one state,
South Carolina. In addition, REMI Inc. has provided access to PI+ for the state of South
Carolina for the purpose of this research; however, due to lack o f funding, it was not
possible to purchase additional versions of the model. A second limitation is that the
accuracy of the data collected from the Office of Audit and Certification, a subdivision of
the Procurement Services Office in South Carolina Budget and Control Board, and the
values of all the variables embedded in the REMI PI+ model cannot be verified. Third,
this analysis does not factor in the effect of reciprocal policies on South Carolina
vendors when they bid on contracts in states that apply the reciprocal policies. The
negative effects of these reciprocal policies could be negative because South Carolina
vendors might lose the opportunity to do business in the state that applies the
reciprocal policy. Fourth, the economic costs (except the direct cost of preferences) of
implementing the preference policies were not analyzed in this study. Identifying the
costs and comparing them with the in-state preferences' benefits might impact the

conclusions of this study. Fifth, since the study is an economic impact study, there is no
attem pt made to assess the social benefits gained from the preference policies.
In addition to the above limitations, there are also others, which are related to
the REMI model itself. Since the model represents a variety of equations and
relationships, it is possible that it could be viewed as a black box by those who are not
familiar with the model. However on their website, REMI has provided users with their
documents to review all underlying assumptions and the data sources on their website.
Finally, given the way the REMI model is built, it can only provide impact for three years
(2010 - 2012) because it does not run simulations in years with actual historical data
(the last year of historical data is 2009).

Delimitations of this Research

Delimitations are defined by Plichta and Garzon (2009, p. 15) as the "boundaries
in which the study was deliberately confined". This research is confined to one state
only and does not attem pt to study the rest of the tw enty-four states that implement in
state preference policies, and this constitutes a delimitation of this study. This study is
also confined by an eight- year tim e frame and does not examine beyond the prescribed
period. A final delimitation of this research is that it is confined to the twenty-nine state
agencies that implemented in-state preferences policies and does not try to examine all
of the contracts implemented by all South Carolina state agencies.
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Future Research

This research examined the economic benefits from implementing in-state
preference policies in South Carolina by measuring quantitative changes in the
economic indicators. The results showed that the value of the indicators increased when
they are compared to the baseline value for each year for the state of South Carolina.
The results have established a foundation for future investigations in five areas of
research.
Since, there are 25 (including South Carolina) states which implement in-state
preference policies, and since every state has its own unique demographics, industries,
and economy, this leads to future investigation to explore the economic impacts of the
preference policies on each of the 24 states applying in-state preferences. Some
researchers and government officials have expressed the need to investigate the impact
of in-state preferences; for example, the Connecticut Departm ent of Administrative
Services (2012), emphasized the importance of investigating the impact of Connecticut
state preference policies. In addition, Moreland (2012) prepared a report for NASPO
about in-state preference policies, and he highlighted the need to study the impact of
preferences. "NASPO believes that more research and cost-benefit analysis studies are
warranted to gauge success rates and gains, if any, or failures of preference programs
and policies, including w hether any state has realized any direct or indirect cost benefit
or loss as a result due to a specific preference" (Moreland, 2012, p. 3).

117

In addition to an investigation into the impacts of preference policies on the
other 24 states, a comparative study to further understand the differences and the
similarities of the impact of in-state preference policies on the states' economies would
raise new questions and stimulate further discussion. Comparing the economic impact
between the 25 states will add a new perspective to the analysis and stands as a topic
for future research.
This study also highlighted the need to investigate reciprocal preferences. The
reciprocal preference laws add a percentage to the out-of-state vendors when their own
states impose preferences on out-of-state vendors, effectively working in the opposite
direction of in-state preference policies. According to NASPO's survey in 2012, thirtyfive states apply reciprocal preference laws to achieve equal treatm ent for their
interested vendors against the bidders who get preference treatm ent in their own
states. If tw enty-five states implement in-state preference policies and thirty-five states
implement reciprocal policies, it might mean that there are some states implementing
both policies. It is critical to understand why these states would implement the two
policies which work against each other, and this is considered to be another area for
future research.
Obviously, there are other costs related to implementing the in-state preference
policies and these costs might outweigh the benefits from implementing the in-state
preference policies. Some of the costs include the opportunity costs that governments
could have lost by not awarding the contracts to out-of-state vendors, the
administrative costs related to managing the contract and determining the eligibility to

118

award the contracts, and costs related to reciprocal policies on South Carolina vendors.
At this tim e, the data that is related to these costs is either not available or is not
measured. This lack of study of the costs of implementing preferences creates another
important area for future research.
Finally, although REMI is considered to be one traditional approach used to
measure the economic impact of a variety of policies, scholars and researchers have
used other types of input-output models and other methods to measure the economic
impact of implementing preferences. Scholars have used ordinary least squares
regression to study the impact of policies on the states' or localities' economy, and
others have used the Regional Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS). Future research
to determ ine if using different methods would yield similar or different findings would
be beneficial.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
LIST OF SOUTH CAROLINA STATE AGENCIES

1. Clemson University
1. Trident Technical College
2. Medical University of South Carolina
3. Coastal Carolina University
4. Juvenile Justice
5. Midlands Technical College
6. University of South Carolina
7.

Parks, Recreation and Tourism

8.

Health and Environmental Control

9.

Materials Managem ent Office

10. Transportation Departm ent
11. Educational Television Commission
12. Aiken Technical College
13. Budget and Control Board
14. Education Lottery
15. Greenville Technical College
16. Winthrop University
17.
18.
19.
20.

Spartanburg Technical College
College of Charleston
Lander University
Piedmont Technical College

21. Central Carolina Technology
22. South Carolina Technical College
23. Northeastern Technical College
24. Spartanburg Community College
25. Public Safety
26. Natural Resources
27. Francis Marion University
28. The Adjutant General of South Carolina
29. The South Carolina Departm ent of Mental Health

Appendix B

DROPPED PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS

A total of six contracts were dropped from the analysis fo r a variety of reasons.
The Parks, Recreation and Tourism Department awarded a contract based on resident
vendor and South Carolina end-product preferences which means that the vendor is a
resident of the state and produces the product in the state as well. The description of
the contracts is "Propane Gas for South Carolina States Parks-Line 2 (Santee)" and the
product in this case is "the gas". The value of the contract is $25. This solicitation was
dropped from the analysis for tw o reasons. First, from the contract description it is not
clear if the vendor produces the gas itself in the state or not. The researcher attempted
to contact the Parks, Recreation and Tourism Departm ent but failed to get a response.
Second, the dollar value of the contract is small compared to the value of the other
contracts.
The remaining five contracts were dropped from the analysis because errors
were discovered in the reports. Two of these contracts were for Trident Technical
College. According to the preference report, both contracts were for computer software
for microcomputers, and they were awarded based on preference type 2 (SC end
product), but the Procurement Department confirmed that the tw o contracts were
awarded based on US end product only. In this case, these contracts are not relevant to
this study. The other three contracts were for Greenville Technical College to buy
Surgical Instruments & Cases, Self Contained Breathing Apparatus, and Welding
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Machines. According to Greenville Technical College's Procurement Office, in two of the
contracts the resident SC vendor provided the lowest bid and the preference laws were
not applicable/ relevant in these awards, and in the third contract the resident vendor
was the only vendor to submit a bid, and the preference policies were not relevant.
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Appendix C
PROBLEMS IDENTIFYING NAICS CODES

1.

South Carolina Department of Mental Health
In 2012, the South Carolina Department of Mental Health awarded a contract

based on preference type 5 (Resident Vendor and US End Product). The description of
the contract includes "Blast Cook-Chiller", which didn't provide enough information to
identify the industry. Bid document for this solicitation was downloaded from the South
Carolina Budget and Control Board website, and the description of the contract was:
"Item Description: Hurrichill Blast Chiller, Model #BCIP or equal, Roll-in, remote
refrigeration, (80) 12 x 20 x 2 1/2" or (40) 18"x 26" pan capacity, 500 lbs. from 160 F to
38 F blast chill capacity/ 90min., solid state electronic control panel with VFD display and
alarms, tw o food probes, s/s interior and exterior, UL listed for safety & sanitation to
NSF standards."

According to the description above, the South Carolina Departm ent of Mental
Health bought the Blast Cook-Chiller from the resident vendor in 2012. Therefore, the
dollar value of this solicitation contributed to the wholesale industry.
2.

University of South Carolina
The researcher contacted the Purchasing Department at the University of South

Carolina to request more information regarding three solicitations. The description of
the first solicitation is "storage server", and it was awarded based on the preference
type 4 (Resident Vendor and South Carolina End Product). The description provided
doesn't give sufficient information to determ ine the NAICS industry, so in this case, it
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was not clear w hether the vendor sells the storage servers and produces them in the
State because the vendor was qualified for preference type 4. If the vendor sells the
product only, the sales from this contract are attributed to the retail or wholesale
industry. If the vendor sells and produces the product, the sales from this contract are
attributed to the Computer servers manufacturing. The Purchasing Department of the
University of South Carolina clarified that the vendor installed the storage server (this is
why the vendor was qualified for the resident vendor preference), and sold the storage
server which was assembled, fabricated or processed in the state.
The description of the second solicitation is "Music Instruments", and it was awarded
based on the preference type 1 (Resident Vendor). In this case, the information
provided is not sufficient to identify the correct NAICS. Upon the researcher's request,
the Purchasing Departm ent of the University of South Carolina sent the solicitation
documents. The solicitation description is "Furnish and Deliver New Music
Instruments". This description identifies that the correct NAICS fo r this solicitation is
wholesale industry.
The description of the third solicitation is "Symetrix Digital Audio Devices", but
the NIGP code is a service code (communications and media related services). This
solicitation was awarded based on preference type 2 (SC End Product). The Purchasing
Department of the University of South Carolina sent the solicitation document and the
more detailed description was "Furnish and Deliver Symetrix SymLink Digital Audio
Devices". Since the preference is type 2, this solicitation contributes to the computer
and electronic product manufacturing.

129

3.

Clemson University
'In 2012, Clemson University awarded a contract and the description

is "YMCA Fence Replacement", but the provided NIGP code is service code (roadside,
grounds, recreational and park area services). The solicitation was awarded based on
the preference type 4 (Resident Vendor and South Carolina End Product). In this case,
since the category is 4, it could indicate that the awarded company produced the fence
and provided the service offence replacement. According to the information provided
by the Procurement Services Office at Clemson University, this solicitation was awarded
based on preference type 5 (Resident Vendor and US End Product), and it should have
been broken into tw o lines (material and labor). In this case, the NAICS industry is
Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing.
This is the response from the Procurement Services Office at Clemson University:
"Ideally we would have broken it out in tw o lines - one for material and one for
labor. Since it was not bid that way but price/scope consisted of both, it appears the
buyer applied the preference based on what they believed or understood to be the
majority of the cost in this instance"
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Appendix D

NAICS INDUSTRIES DEFINITIONS

1.

Wholesale Trade
The Wholesale Trade sector comprises establishments engaged in wholesaling
merchandise, generally without transformation, and rendering services
incidental to the sale of merchandise. The merchandise described in this sector
includes the outputs of agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and certain
information industries, such as publishing. The wholesaling process is an
interm ediate step in the distribution of merchandise. Wholesalers are organized
to sell or arrange the purchase or sale of (a) goods for resale (i.e., goods sold to
other wholesalers or retailers), (b) capital or durable nonconsumer goods, and
(c) raw and intermediate materials and supplies used in production.
Wholesalers sell merchandise to other businesses and normally operate from a
warehouse or office. These warehouses and offices are characterized by having
little or no display of merchandise. In addition, neither the design nor the
location of the premises is intended to solicit walk-in traffic. Wholesalers do not
normally use advertising directed to the general public. Customers are generally
reached initially via telephone, in-person marketing, or by specialized advertising
that may include Internet and other electronic means. Follow-up orders are
either vendor-initiated or client-initiated, generally based on previous sales, and
typically exhibit strong ties between sellers and buyers. In fact, transactions are
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often conducted between wholesalers and clients that have long-standing
business relationships.
This sector comprises two main types of wholesalers: merchant wholesalers that
sell goods on their own account and business-to-business electronic markets,
agents, and brokers that arrange sales and purchases for others generally for a
commission or fee.
(1) Establishments that sell goods on their own account are known as wholesale
merchants, distributors, jobbers, drop shippers, and im port/export merchants.
Also included as wholesale merchants are sales offices and sales branches (but
not retail stores) maintained by manufacturing, refining, or mining enterprises
apart from their plants or mines for the purpose of marketing their products and
group purchasing organizations (e.g., purchasing and selling goods on their own
account). Merchant wholesale establishments typically maintain their own
warehouse, where they receive and handle goods for their customers. Goods are
generally sold without transformation, but may include integral functions, such
as sorting, packaging, labeling, and other marketing services.
(2) Establishments arranging for the purchase or sale of goods owned by others
or purchasing goods, generally on a commission basis are known as business-tobusiness electronic markets, agents and brokers, commission merchants,
im port/export agents and brokers, auction companies, group purchasing
organization (e.g., purchasing or arranging for the purchases of goods owned by
others), and manufacturers' representatives. These establishments operate from
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offices and generally do not own or handle the goods they sell.
Some wholesale establishments may be connected with a single manufacturer
and promote and sell the particular manufacturers' products to a wide range of
other wholesalers or retailers. Other wholesalers may be connected to a retail
chain, or limited number of retail chains, and only provide a variety of products
needed by that particular retail operation(s). These wholesalers may obtain the
products from a wide range of manufacturers. Still other wholesalers may not
take title to the goods, but act as agents and brokers for a commission.
Although, in general, wholesaling normally denotes sales in large volumes,
durable nonconsumer goods may be sold in single units. Sales of capital or
durable nonconsumer goods used in the production of goods and services, such
as farm machinery, medium- and heavy-duty trucks, and industrial machinery,
are always included in wholesale trade.
Construction
The Construction sector comprises establishments primarily engaged in the
construction of buildings or engineering projects (e.g., highways and utility
systems). Establishments primarily engaged in the preparation of sites for new
construction and establishments primarily engaged in subdividing land for sale as
building sites also are included in this sector.
Construction work done may include new work, additions, alterations, or
maintenance and repairs. Activities of these establishments generally are
managed at a fixed place of business, but they usually perform construction

activities at multiple project sites. Production responsibilities for establishments
in this sector are usually specified in (1) contracts with the owners of
construction projects (prime contracts) or (2) contracts with other construction
establishments (subcontracts).
Establishments primarily engaged in contracts that include responsibility for all
aspects of individual construction projects are commonly known as general
contractors, but also may be known as design-builders, construction managers,
turnkey contractors, or (in cases where tw o or more establishments jointly
secure a general contract) joint-venture contractors. Construction managers that
provide oversight and scheduling only (i.e., agency) as well as construction
managers that are responsible for the entire project (i.e., at risk) are included as
general contractor type establishments. Establishments o f the "general
contractor type" frequently arrange construction of separate parts of their
projects through subcontracts with other construction establishments.
Establishments primarily engaged in activities to produce a specific component
(e.g., masonry, painting, and electrical work) of a construction project are
commonly known as specialty trade contractors. Activities of specialty trade
contractors are usually subcontracted from other construction establishments,
but especially in remodeling and repair construction, the work may be done
directly for the owner of the property.
Establishments primarily engaged in activities to construct buildings to be sold
on sites that they own are known as for-sale builders, but also may be known as
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speculative builders or merchant builders. For-sale builders produce buildings in
a manner similar to general contractors, but their production processes also
include site acquisition and securing of financial backing. For-sale builders are
most often associated with the construction of residential buildings. Like general
contractors, they may subcontract all or part of the actual construction work on
their buildings.
There are substantial differences in the types of equipment, work force skills,
and other inputs required by establishments in this sector. To highlight these
differences and variations in the underlying production functions, this sector is
divided into three subsectors.
Subsector 236, Construction of Buildings, comprises establishments of the
general contractor type and for-sale builders involved in the construction of
buildings. Subsector 237, Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction, comprises
establishments involved in the construction of engineering projects. Subsector
238, Specialty Trade Contractors, comprises establishments engaged in specialty
trade activities generally needed in the construction of all types of buildings.
Force account construction is construction work performed by an enterprise
primarily engaged in some business other than construction for its own account,
using employees of the enterprise. This activity is not included in the
construction sector unless the construction work performed is the primary
activity of a separate establishment of the enterprise. The installation and the
ongoing repair and maintenance of telecommunications and utility networks is
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excluded from construction when the establishments performing the work are
not independent contractors. Although a growing proportion of this work is
subcontracted to independent contractors in the Construction sector, the
operating units of telecommunications and utility companies performing this
work are included with the telecommunications or utility activities.
Printing and Related Support Activities
Industries in the Printing and Related Support Activities subsector print products,
such as newspapers, books, labels, business cards, stationery, business forms,
and other materials, and perform support activities, such as data imaging,
platemaking services, and bookbinding. The support activities included here are
an integral part of the printing industry, and a product (a printing plate, a bound
book, or a computer disk or file) that is an integral part of the printing industry is
almost always provided by these operations.
Processes used in printing include a variety of methods used to transfer an image
from a plate, screen, film, or computer file to some medium, such as paper,
plastics, metal, textile articles, or wood. The printing processes employed
include, but are not limited to, lithographic, gravure, screen, flexographic, digital,
and letterpress.
In contrast to many other classification systems that locate publishing of printed
materials in manufacturing, NAICS classifies the publishing of printed products in
Subsector 511, Publishing Industries (except Internet). Though printing and
publishing are often carried out by the same enterprise (a newspaper, for

example), it is less and less the case that these distinct activities are carried out
in the same establishment. When publishing and printing are done in the same
establishment, the establishment is classified in Sector 51, Information, in the
appropriate NAICS industry even if the receipts for printing exceed those for
publishing.
This subsector includes printing on clothing because the production process for
that activity is printing, not clothing manufacturing. For instance, the printing of
T-shirts is included in this subsector. In contrast, printing on fabric (or grey
goods) is not included. This activity is part of the process of finishing the fabric
and is included in the NAICS Textile Mills subsector in Industry 31331, Textile and
Fabric Finishing Mills.
Administrative and Support Services
Industries in the Administrative and Support Services subsector group
establishments engaged in activities that support the day-to-day operations of
other organizations. The processes employed in this sector (e.g., general
management, personnel administration, clerical activities, cleaning activities) are
often integral parts of the activities of establishments found in all sectors of the
economy. The establishments classified in this subsector have specialization in
one or more of these activities and can, therefore, provide services to clients in a
variety of industries and, in some cases, to households. The individual industries
of this subsector are defined on the basis of the particular process that they are
engaged in and the particular services they provide.

Many of the activities performed in this subsector are ongoing routine support
functions that all businesses and organizations must do and that they have
traditionally done for themselves. Recent trends, however, are to contract or
purchase such services from businesses that specialize in such activities and can,
therefore, provide the services more efficiently.
The industries in this subsector cannot be viewed as strictly "support." The
Travel Arrangement and Reservation Services industry group includes travel
agents, tour operators, and providers of other travel arrangement services, such
as hotel and restaurant reservations and arranging the purchase of tickets,
serving many types of clients, including individual consumers. This group was
placed in this subsector because the services are often of the "support" nature
(e.g., travel arrangement) and businesses and other organizations are
increasingly the ones purchasing such services.
The administrative and management activities performed by establishments in
this sector are typically on a contract or fee basis. These activities may also be
performed by establishments that are part of the company or enterprise.
However, establishments involved in administering, overseeing, and managing
other establishments of the company or enterprise are classified in Sector 55,
Managem ent of Companies and Enterprises. Establishments in Sector 55
normally undertake the strategic and organizational planning and decision
making role of the company or enterprise. Government establishments engaged
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in administering, overseeing, and managing governmental programs are
classified in Sector 92, Public Administration.
5.

Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
The Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services sector comprises
establishments that specialize in performing professional, scientific, and
technical activities for others. These activities require a high degree of expertise
and training. The establishments in this sector specialize according to expertise
and provide these services to clients in a variety of industries and, in some cases,
to households. Activities performed include: legal advice and representation;
accounting, bookkeeping, and payroll services; architectural, engineering, and
specialized design services; computer services; consulting services; research
services; advertising services; photographic services; translation and
interpretation services; veterinary services; and other professional, scientific,
and technical services.
This sector excludes establishments primarily engaged in providing a range of
day-to-day office administrative services, such as financial planning, billing and
recordkeeping, personnel, and physical distribution and logistics. These
establishments are classified in Sector 56, Administrative and Support and Waste
Managem ent and Remediation Services.

6.

Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Industries in the Miscellaneous Manufacturing subsector make a wide range of
products that cannot readily be classified in specific NAICS subsectors in
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manufacturing. Processes used by these establishments vary significantly, both
among and within industries. For example, a variety of manufacturing processes
are used in manufacturing sporting and athletic goods that include products such
as tennis racquets and golf balls. The processes for these products differ from
each other, and the processes differ significantly from the fabrication processes
used in making dolls or toys, the melting and shaping of precious metals to make
jewelry, and the bending, forming, and assembly used in making medical
products. The industries in this subsector are defined by w hat is made rather
than how it is made. Although individual establishments might be appropriately
classified elsewhere in the NAICS structure, for historical continuity, these
product-based industries were maintained. In most cases, no one process or
material predominates for an industry.
Establishments in this subsector manufacture products as diverse as medical
equipment and supplies, jewelry, sporting goods, toys, and office supplies.
Machinery Manufacturing
Industries in the Machinery Manufacturing subsector create end products that
apply mechanical force, for example, the application of gears and levers, to
perform work. Some important processes for the manufacture of machinery are
forging, stamping, bending, forming, and machining that are used to shape
individual pieces of metal. Processes, such as welding and assembling are used
to join separate parts together. Although these processes are similar to those
used in metal fabricating establishments, machinery manufacturing is different

because it typically employs multiple metal forming processes in manufacturing
the various parts of the machine. Moreover, complex assembly operations are
an inherent part of the production process.
In general, design considerations are very important in machinery production.
Establishments specialize in making machinery designed for particular
applications. Thus, design is considered to be part of the production process for
the purpose of implementing NAICS. The NAICS structure reflects this by defining
industries and industry groups that make machinery for different applications. A
broad distinction exists between machinery that is generally used in a variety of
industrial applications (i.e., general purpose machinery) and machinery that is
designed to be used in a particular industry (i.e., special purpose machinery).
Three industry groups consist of special purpose machinery-Agricultural,
Construction, and Mining Machinery Manufacturing; Industrial Machinery
Manufacturing; and Commercial and Service Industry Machinery Manufacturing.
The other industry groups make general-purpose machinery: Ventilation,
Heating, Air-Conditioning, and Commercial Refrigeration Equipment
Manufacturing; Metalworking Machinery Manufacturing; Engine, Turbine, and
Power Transmission Equipment Manufacturing; and Other General Purpose
Machinery Manufacturing.
8.

Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing
Industries in the Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing subsector make
furniture and related articles, such as mattresses, window blinds, cabinets, and
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fixtures. The processes used in the manufacture of furniture include the cutting,
bending, molding, laminating, and assembly of such materials as wood, metal,
glass, plastics, and rattan. However, the production process for furniture is not
solely bending metal, cutting and shaping wood, or extruding and molding
plastics. Design and fashion trends play an im portant part in the production of
furniture. The integrated design of the article for both esthetic and functional
qualities is also a major part of the process of manufacturing furniture. Design
services may be performed by the furniture establishment's work force or may
be purchased from industrial designers.
Furniture may be made of any material, but the most common ones used in
North America are metal and wood. Furniture manufacturing establishments
may specialize in making articles primarily from one material. Some of the
equipment required to make a wooden table, for example, is different from that
used to make a metal one. However, furniture is usually made from several
materials. A wooden table might have metal brackets, and a wooden chair a
fabric or plastics seat. Therefore, in NAICS, furniture initially is classified based on
the type of furniture (application for which it is designed) rather than the
material used. For example, an upholstered sofa is treated as household
furniture, although it may also be used in hotels or offices.
W hen classifying furniture according to the component material from which it is
made, furniture made from more than one material is classified based on the
material used in the frame, or if there is no frame, the predominant component
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material. Upholstered household furniture (excluding kitchen and dining room
chairs with upholstered seats) is classified without regard to the fram e material.
Kitchen or dining room chairs with upholstered seats are classified according to
the fram e material.
Furniture may be made on a stock or custom basis and may be shipped
assembled or unassembled (i.e., knockdown). The manufacture of furniture parts
and frames is included in this subsector.
Some of the processes used in furniture manufacturing are similar to processes
that are used in other segments of manufacturing. For example, cutting and
assembly occurs in the production of wood trusses that are classified in
Subsector 321, Wood Product Manufacturing. However, the multiple processes
that distinguish wood furniture manufacturing from wood product
manufacturing warrant inclusion of wooden furniture manufacturing in the
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing subsector. M etal furniture
manufacturing uses techniques that are also employed in the manufacturing of
roll-formed products classified in Subsector 332, Fabricated Metal Product
Manufacturing. The molding process for plastics furniture is similar to the
molding of other plastics products. However, plastics furniture producing
establishments tend to specialize in furniture.
NAICS attempts to keep furniture manufacturing together, but there are two
notable exceptions: seating for transportation equipment and specialized
hospital furniture (e.g., hospital beds and operating tables). These exceptions are
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related to the fact that some of the aspects of the production process for these
products, primarily the design, are highly integrated with the other
manufactured goods, namely motor vehicles and health equipment.
9.

Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
Industries in the Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing subsector
group establishments that manufacture computers, computer peripherals,
communications equipment, and similar electronic products, and establishments
that manufacture components for such products. The Computer and Electronic
Product Manufacturing industries have been combined in the hierarchy of NAICS
because of the economic significance they have attained. Their rapid growth
suggests that they will become even more important to the economies of all
three North American countries in the future, and in addition their
manufacturing processes are fundamentally different from the manufacturing
processes of other machinery and equipment. The design and use of integrated
circuits and the application of highly specialized miniaturization technologies are
common elements in the production technologies of the computer and
electronic subsector. Convergence of technology motivates this NAICS subsector.
Digitalization of sound recording, for example, causes both the medium (the
compact disc) and the equipment to resemble the technologies for recording,
storing, transmitting, and manipulating data. Communications technology and
equipm ent have been converging with computer technology. When
technologically-related components are in the same sector, it makes it easier to
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adjust the classification for future changes, without needing to redefine its basic
structure. The creation of the Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
subsector assists in delineating new and emerging industries because the
activities that will serve as the probable sources of new industries, such as
computer manufacturing and communications equipm ent manufacturing, or
computers and audio equipment, are brought together. As new activities
emerge, they are less likely therefore, to cross the subsector boundaries of the
classification.
10. Wood Product Manufacturing
Industries in the Wood Product Manufacturing subsector manufacture wood
products, such as lumber, plywood, veneers, wood containers, wood flooring,
wood trusses, manufactured homes (i.e., mobile homes), and prefabricated
wood buildings. The production processes of the Wood Product Manufacturing
subsector include sawing, planning, shaping, laminating, and assembling of wood
products starting from logs that are cut into bolts, or lumber that then may be
further cut, or shaped by lathes or other shaping tools. The lumber or other
transformed wood shapes may also be subsequently planed or smoothed, and
assembled into finished products, such as wood containers. The Wood Product
Manufacturing subsector includes establishments that make wood products
from logs and bolts that are sawed and shaped, and establishments that
purchase sawed lumber and make wood products. W ith the exception of
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sawmills and wood preservation establishments, the establishments are grouped
into industries mainly based on the specific products manufactured.
11. Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing
Industries in the Electrical Equipment, Appliance, and Component Manufacturing
subsector manufacture products that generate, distribute and use electrical
power. Electric Lighting Equipment Manufacturing establishments produce
electric lamp bulbs, lighting fixtures, and parts. Household Appliance
Manufacturing establishments make both small and major electrical appliances
and parts. Electrical Equipment Manufacturing establishments make goods, such
as electric motors, generators, transformers, and switchgear apparatus. Other
Electrical Equipment and Component Manufacturing establishments make
devices for storing electrical power (e.g., batteries), for transmitting electricity
(e.g., insulated wire), and wiring devices (e.g., electrical outlets, fuse boxes, and
light switches).
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Appendix E

SOUTH CAROLINA ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
South Carolina is the 40th largest state with an area of 30,060 square miles and
an estimated population of 4,723,723 (Census of Bureau, 2013). The population per
square mile is 153.9. The data shows that South Carolina's population has grown since
2009. According to The South Carolina Department of Commerce Research Division
(2010, p. 9), "Between 2000 and 2009 the population in South Carolina increased 13.4%,
13.1% for the southeast, and 8.8% for the US". In 2012, South Carolina's unemployment
rate was 8.6 ranking 10th highest among the other states (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2013). Compared to the national unemployment rate of 7.8, South Carolina has a higher
rate than the national average. GSP for 2011 is $385,092, for 2010 is $378,131, for 2009
is $368,963, for 2008 is $377,869 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2013). Personal income
per capita in 2011 is $33,636, in 2010 is $32,193 (Federal Reserve Economic Data, 2013).
Durable goods manufacturing contributed the most to the increase in the GSP (added
.82%). "The large gains in the durable goods sector likely reflect rising output at BMW's
operations in the Upstate and the ramp up of Boeing's operations in North Charleston"
(Vitner & Silverman, 2013, p. 3). In addition to the durable goods, nondurable goods
manufacturing, wholesale trade, government and real estate contributes to the GSP by
a quarter of a percentage point (The South Carolina Department o f Commerce Research
Division, 2010). In 2012, the State added 32,400 jobs, and most o f the jobs were in
leisure and hospitality and retail trade. Construction firms added 4,200 jobs in 2012 as
well (Feik, 2013).
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SOUTH CAROLINA 2012 ECONOMIC PROFILE

Area
■

30,060 square miles

Population
■

4.7 million residents

Employment
■

2,514,481

Gross State Product
■

$176.2 billion

Manufacturing
■

textile, clothing, wood, tourism

Services
■

wholesale and retail trade
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Appendix F

ABBREVIATION TABLE

BEA

Bureau of Economic Analysis

BLS

Bureau of Labor Statistics

CAP

Common Agricultural Policy

CBP

County Business Patterns

EU

European Union

FASA

Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act

FECCAP

Florida Energy and Climate Change Action Plan

GATT

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GPA

Government Procurement Agreement

GSP

Gross State Product

IMPLAN

Impact Analysis for Planning

MAPE

Mean Absolute Percentage Error

NAICS

The North American Industry Classification System

NASPO

The National Association of State Procurement Officials

NIGP

The National Institute of Governmental Purchasing

RCP

Resident Contractor Preference

REND-PRODUCTP

Resident Subcontractor Preference

REMI

Regional Economic Model
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REMI PI+/ PI+

Regional Economic Model the Policy Insight Model

RIMS II

Regional Input-Output Modeling System

RSCP

Resident Subcontractor Preference

RSQE

Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics

RVP

Resident Vendor Preference

SCEPP

South Carolina end-product preference

USEPP

United States end-product preference

Wist

Wist Office Products

WTO

World Trade Organization
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